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In the early part of the 17th century, Gerard Malynes wrote:
The Credit of Merchants [banks?] is so delicate and tender,
that it must bee cared for as the apple of mans eye: Hence it
doth proceed that Letters of Credit are had in such reputa-
tion, that the giver of them will bee well advised before hee
doe make them .... 1
It should also follow that counsel, judge, and legislator should each
"bee well advised before hee doe make" a judgment concerning letters
of credit.
As with the methods designed to effect and secure payment other
than by delivery of legal tender, acceptability of letters of credit in the
commercial world is as "delicate and tender" as Malynes considered a
merchant's credit to be. Consequently, counsel in a letter of credit case
may win a battle in a lower court before a judge who has not been
"well advised." A statute enacted by a legislature may "misspeak" in
the same way. The unfortunate secondary effects of the win or the stat-
ute on letter of credit acceptability may far outweigh the resulting sin-
gle-client benefit or statutory benefit.
Three recent cases' illustrate different insolvency shocks that affect
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1 G. MALYNES, CONSUETUDO, VEL LEX MERCATORIA, OR THE ANCIENT LAW-
MERCHANT 104 (1st ed. 1622).
2 The three cases are:
(A) In re Swift Aire Lines, Inc., 20 Bankr. 286 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 30
Bankr. 490 (9th Cir. 1983) (insolvent beneficiary).
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the functioning of letters of credit. Each initially gave a severe jolt to
the acceptability of letters of credit, and the subsequent effect of these
cases has been immense. To add to the confusion, different parties are
governed by different insolvency systems. Insolvency of the issuing bank
is governed by one legal system,8 while insolvency of the beneficiary
and account party is usually governed by the Federal Bankruptcy
Code.4 Should either party be an insolvent insurance company, a third
set of insolvency rules comes into play.5 The rules in each insolvency
system may not adequately treat letters of credit.
(B) Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. F.D.I.C., 587 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Okla. 1982),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 426
(1986) (insolvent issuing bank).
(C) In re Twist Cap., Inc., 1 Bankr. 284 (D. Fla. 1979) (insolvent account party).
For critical analysis of the Twist Cap case, see Baird, Standby Letters of Credit in
Bankruptcy, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 130 (1982); Chaitman & Sovern, Enjoining Payment
on a Letter of Credit in Bankruptcy: A Tempest in Twist Cap, 38 Bus. LAW. 21
(1982); Hahn & Schwartz, Letters of Credit Under the Bankruptcy Code, 16 U.C.C.
L.J. 91 (1983); McLaughlin, Letters of Credit as Preferential Transfers in Bank-
ruptcy, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 1033 (1982); see also Saunders, Preference Avoidance
and Letter of Credit Supported Debt: The Bank's Reimbursement Risk in its Cus-
tomer's Bankruptcy, 102 BANKING L.J. 240 (1985); Unscrewing Twistcap (Counsel's
Comer), 100 BANKING L.J. 636 (1983).
1 Banks are expressly excluded from the coverage of the Bankruptcy Code. 11
U.S.C. § 109 (1982 & Supp. III 1986). Hence, banks insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation [hereinafter F.D.I.C.], which subsequently become insolvent,
are governed by equity receiverships in which the F.D.I.C. acts in a dual capacity as
both receiver and insurer of the insolvent bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982 & Supp. III
1986). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act authorizes the F.D.I.C., as
insurer, to purchase the failed bank's assets from itself as receiver in order to facilitate
a purchase and assumption of the failed bank's assets and liabilities. 12 U.S.C. § 1823
(c)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1986).
A non-insured state bank is subject to liquidation under that state's banking code.
See, e.g., 4 N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 605-633 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1987); 7 PA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1801-1809 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1986). State banking laws cannot
affect the insolvency rules governing national banks. See Jennings v. United States Fi-
delity & Guar. Co., 294 U.S. 216, 219 (1935).
Should the issuer of the letter of credit be a savings and loan association insured
by the F.S.L.I.C., the latter would act as receiver and insurer.
' Business corporations, defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (1982 & Supp. III 1986),
are subject to Chapters 7 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. 103(a) (1982 &
Supp. III 1986). Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code deals exclusively with liquidation
of the business upon insolvency, while Chapter 11 deals with reorganization of the
business.
Likewise, "debtor(s)," defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1982 & Supp. III 1986),
and "creditor(s)," defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1982 & Supp. III 1986), are also
allowed to proceed under Chapters 7 and/or 11 pursuant to section 103. The vast bulk
of insolvent letter of credit account parties (buyers) and beneficiaries (sellers) generally
fall within these broad provisions.
' Insurance companies are expressly excluded from liquidation under Chapter 7
and reorganization under Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1986).
As such, applicable state insurance law governs the insolvency of an insurance com-
pany. See, e.g., 42 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1010-1062 (West 1972 & Supp. 1987); 40 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN §§ 221.1-221.63 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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This article will first consider two fundamental principles of letter
of credit law, the "independence principle" and the "strict compliance"
rule. The question then arises as to whether these principles will be
seriously affected by the insolvency rules, or whether they need modifi-
cation to secure proper results when one or more of the three parties to
a letter of credit transaction becomes insolvent. It will then examine the
effect of the insolvency of each of the parties on letter of credit transac-
tions - whether the insolvency be only of that party, or whether a
different effect might be experienced where two of the three major ac-
tors become insolvent. Finally, it will discuss whether more satisfactory
results could be obtained by revising the text or comments of Article 5
of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) or of the relevant insol-
vency rules.
1. THE INDEPENDENCE PRINCIPLE
Familiar to those dealing in letters of credit is the prohibition
against treating the entire "transaction" as one "deal." 6 For letters of
credit to be commercially acceptable as a means of payment, any analy-
sis must proceed on the basis of the existence of at least three entirely
independent contracts for almost all purposes. The typical transaction
involves a contract between two or more parties calling for the payment
of money on a specified occasion pursuant to a letter of credit. As be-
tween themselves, one party could be called the "recipient of money,"
and the other the "contractor to pay." The specified occasion for the
money payment may be a shipment of goods, an arrival of goods, the
performance of services, or the payment of liquidated or other damages.
I See, e.g., East Girard Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d
598 (5th Cir. 1979); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.
1979); Westwind Exploration, Inc. v. Homestate Say. Ass'n, 696 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.
1985); see also J. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT 11 2.0913], 4.03[6][A]
(1984 & Supp. 1987); 6 W. HAWKLAND & L. HOLLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SERIES § 5-114:02 (1986 & Supp. 1987); Graham & Geva, Standby Credits in
Canada, 9 CAN. Bus. L.J. 180, 190 (1984) ("It is basic to letter of credit law that the
credit be autonomous in relation to the contract between the account-party and the
beneficiary."). See generally Ellinger, The Autonomy of Letters of Credit, 4 MALAYA
L. REV. 307 (1962) (amendments to underlying contract of sale will not affect letter of
credit payment obligation); Stern, The Independence Rule in Standby Letters of
Credit, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 218 (1985) ("fraud in the transaction" exception to the
independence principle should be narrowly construed).
Even the "may honor" exception under the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinaf-
ter U.C.C. or Code] U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b)(1978), where the presenter is not a holder in
due course, should support dishonor only in the clearest cases of non-entitlement. Ro-
man Ceramics Corp. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 714 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1983) (also see J.
Adams dissenting). But as is shown infra text accompanying notes 10-15, there are a
few other occasions where this independence is disregarded.
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This is known as "the underlying contract."
The second contract is between the "contractor to pay," now re-
christened the "account party," and the bank issuing the letter of credit
or causing the letter of credit to be issued. It is black letter law that this
contract is independent of the underlying contract and the letter of
credit itself.' This contract is called the "application for the credit." In
it, the "account party" specifies which documents are to be required
under the letter of credit, and agrees to reimburse the issuer for, or
supply the issuer in advance with, funds used or to be used for payment
under the letter of credit. The contract also may provide for collateral
in order to assure the issuer of advance or subsequent reimbursement
upon the issuer's payment to the beneficiary.
The letter of credit itself is the third agreement. This agreement is
between the issuer and the recipient of money, now appearing as "the
beneficiary." The letter of credit states that the issuer will pay a de-
scribed amount. It also specifies - often as a condition to the obliga-
tion to pay - any documents that must accompany the demand to
make the demand proper. Further, it stipulates whether payment or
negotiation must occur before a specified date, called the "expiry date."
After such a date, there having been no prior demand for payment, the
issuer's liability ceases.' If the expiry date is keyed to negotiation, then
I The obligation of an issuer to a beneficiary under a letter of credit is also almost
always enforced without regard to the contract between the account party and the is-
suer. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1977); Baker v.
National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See also Bartholomew, Re-
lations Between Banker and Seller Under Irrevocable Letters of Credit, 5 MCGILL
L.J. 89 (1959).
One effect of the independence principle is that the issuer can refuse to amend -
even at the request of both the applicant and the beneficiary. See AMF Head Sports
Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All-American Sports Club, 448 F. Supp. 222 (D. Ariz.
1978); see also East Bank v. Dovenmuehle, Inc., 196 Colo. 422, 589 P.2d 1361
(1978)(letters of credit cannot be modified by custom or usage of trade but query the
effect of U.C.C. § 1-205); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 173 Conn. 492, 378 A.2d 562 (1977) (modification of underlying contract does not
alter terms of the letter); Intraworld Indus. Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343,
336 A.2d 316 (1975) (payment pursuant to a letter of credit may be enjoined only if the
beneficiary has no bona fide claim to payment or the underlying documentation has no
basis in fact).
' The general rule is that both banks and courts enforce credit expiry dates
strictly, as time is considered of the essence. See Courtaulds N. Am., Inc. v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 1975); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Say. Ass'n v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 116 F. Supp. 233, 243 (W.D. Okla.
1953), affld, 218 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1955); Easton Tire Co. v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, 642 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Anglo-South Am. Trust Co. v. Uhe,
261 N.Y. 150, 184 N.E. 741 (1933); W. Pat Crow Forgings, Inc. v. Moorings Aero
Indus., Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 65, 403 N.Y.S.2d 399 (App. Term 1978) (oral extension of
expiry date ineffective); Siderius, Inc. v. Wallace Co., 583 S.W.2d 852, 860 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979) (issuer is under no obligation to honor a draft presented after the expiry
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the issuer's obligation does not cease until a further time period - the
reasonable time for presentment" - has expired.
Although the "independence principle," if stated too broadly,
would treat the three contracts as if they had no connection with each
other, it seems more accurate to say that almost all defenses to perform-
ance and almost all failures of consideration under any one contract do
not automatically impair or suspend obligation of either of the other
two. Nevertheless, a contractor to pay, for example, is interested in
having the payment made under the letter of credit upon the proper
tender of documents. The recipient of money wants to ensure certainty
of payment upon proper tender. The issuer of commercial credit is in-
terested in the quality of the goods, the subject of the underlying con-
tract, because they often are part and parcel of the proferred security
that induced the issuance of the letter.
Exceptions to the independence rule protect, in a very limited
sense, the interests that cross over into the other independent contracts.
These exceptions are the "fraud in the transaction" rule1° and the ille-
date). But see Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d
699 (1st Cir. 1978) (Where all necessary documents were timely presented, clarification
of the details therein may follow the expiry date.); Temple-Eastex Inc. v. Addison
Bank, 665 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 672 S.W.2d 793
(Tex. 1984) (where court used U.C.C. § 3-503(3) to excuse a late presentment). The
rule of strict enforcement of credit expiry dates is the majority rule even in those cases
where the result is to impose hardship on the beneficiary. Accord Consolidated Alumi-
num Corp. v. Bank of Virginia, 544 F. Supp. 386 (D. Md. 1982), aff d, 704 F.2d 136
(4th Cir. 1983); Hyland Hills Metro. Park & Recreation Dist. v. McCoy Enter., Inc.,
38 Colo. App. 23, 554 P.2d 708 (1976); see INA v. Heritage Bank, 595 F.2d 171 (3d
Cir. 1979) (where lapse of expiry date resulted in deprivation of beneficiary's security).
I As Professor Dolan makes clear, "the time that honor occurs is a matter of
negotiable instruments law, not letter-of-credit law." J. DOLAN, supra note 6, at I
5.03[2][b]. These rules are contained in Article 3 of the U.C.C. See 5 W. HAWKLAND
& L. HOLLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 3-502:01 (1986). U.C.C. §
3-503 (1)(e) provides that to fix the liability of any secondary party "presentment for
acceptance or payment of any other instrument is due within a reasonable time after
such party becomes liable thereon." Section 3-503 also states:
(3) Where any presentment is due on a day which is not a full business
day for either the person making the presentment or the party to pay or
accept, presentment is due on the next following day which is a full busi-
ness day for both parties.
(4) Presentment to be sufficient must be made at a reasonable hour, and if
at a bank during its banking day.
Id. Excused delay is covered by U.C.C. § 3-511, Waiver and Excuse. We presume that
Professor Dolan would not include any states which allow extensions of time to pay
stated in U.C.C. Article 3. This begs the question: if honor is governed by Article 3,
should not actions constituting an extension of time to honor also be included?
10 The leading fraud case is Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177
Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941). There, the beneficiary presented invoices
describing the contract merchandise as "bristles" required by the credit. The account
party, claiming that the beneficiary had instead shipped worthless horse-hair materials,
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gality rule."1 It is submitted that just as the rules pertaining to the
alleged that the documents were fraudulent, and sued to enjoin payment of the credit.
The court concluded that while the independence principle should be the rule, it does
not extend "to protect the unscrupulous seller [who engages in an] . . . intentional
fraud." Id. at 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634; see J. DOLAN, supra note 6, at 7.04[2]. For
codification of the Sztejn rule, see U.C.C. § 5-114(2); see also Sztejning (Steining) the
Letter of Credit: More Strings for the Bow (Counsel's Corner), 93 BANKING L.J. 954
(1976).
Hence, the general rule has evolved to the point that, where there is evidence of
fraud in the transaction, the issuer may, but is not obliged to, refuse to honor the
demand for payment where in fact the presenter is not a holder in due course, nor a
"due negotiatee" of a required document of title. U.C.C. § 5-114 official comment 2.
See, e.g., Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 730 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1984) (injunc-
tion obtained through showing of fraud and no alternative legal remedy); First Com-
mercial Bank v. Gotham Originals, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 287, 475 N.E.2d 1255, 486
N.Y.S.2d 715 (1955); Chiat/Day Inc., Advertising v. Kalimian, 105 A.D.2d 94, 483
N.Y.S.2d 235 (App. Div. 1984) (landlord not enjoined from drawing upon letter of
credit purchased by tenant because lease was only breached in part, and monetary
damages were an available remedy); see also J. DOLAN, supra note 6, at 7.04[3];
ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-114:11 (3d ed. 1985); 6 W. HAWK-
LAND & L. HOLLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 5-114:05 (1986).
Although commonly called "the fraud in the transaction rule," the preamble in
subsection (2) of U.C.C. § 5-114 refers to four situations: (i) Breach of a warranty of
negotiation or transfer of a document of title or security; (ii) A forged required docu-
ment; (iii) A fraudulent required document; or (iv) Fraud in the transaction. A full
discussion of enjoining honor is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the House of
Lords, while recognizing the doctrine of "fraud in the transaction," see, e.g., Discount
Records Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., [19751 1 W.L.R. 315 (Ch. 1974), has limited the
rule to fraud committed or participated in by a beneficiary, and has ruled that no
injunction could be issued where independent shipping brokers had, without the knowl-
edge of the beneficiary, fraudulently backdated a shipping document to make it comply
with the credit "on its face." United City Merchants (Investments), Ltd. v. Royal Bank
of Canada, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039 (H.L.). Interestingly, there was no indication that
the account party had participated in fraud. Id.
The UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce 1983) [hereinafter U.C.P.] makes no reference to the
doctrine. California has omitted from its revision of U.C.C. § 5-114 the words, "but a
court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such payment." CAL. COM. CODE § 5114
(West 1964 & Supp. 1987).
For a further discussion on enjoining honor of commercial or standby letters of
credit when there is no fraud in the transaction, see Thorup, Injunctions Against Pay-
ment of Standby Letters of Credit: How Can Banks Best Protect Themselves?, 101
BANKING L.J. 6 (1984).
" Where the countries of both the account party (England) and the beneficiary
(Peru) were parties to the Bretton Woods Agreement to recognize each others' currency
control laws, a court in one country should not enforce the part of the transaction
constituting a fraud on the currency control scheme of the other country. See Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (Bretton Woods Agreement), July 22,
1944, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501. Thus, where Peruvian buyers had induced
British sellers to double the cost on their invoice and draft under the letter of credit (for
which the foreign exchanges could be purchased legally) and deposit the excess to the
buyer's credit in a bank in Miami, Florida (which could not legally be done directly by
the buyers), recovery under the letter on the final drawing was reduced by one half.
United Merchants (Investments), Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1982] 2 W.L.R.
1039, 1051 (H.L.). No reduction, however, in the required payment was made in re-
spect of the fraudulent increase in the prior drawing.
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"real defenses" have not impaired the usefulness and acceptability of
negotiable instruments,12 the rules of fraud in the transaction and ille-
gality, if not unduly extended, will not impair either the usefulness or
the acceptability of letters of credit. Further, just as the rules for the
recovery of payments made have not had a totally adverse effect on the
acceptability of negotiable instruments,1" the few rules permitting re-
covery of payments made under letters of credit will not destroy the
usefulness of this payment-assuring device.
Thus, a complete failure of any of the three contracts affects the
interests of one of the parties to each of the other two. To a limited
extent, the law affords redress for this failure. 4 Perhaps the indepen-
dence principle correctly rests upon the premise that banks should not
be required to decide the factual issues which are necessary to deter-
mine the existence of most defenses to an underlying contract. Never-
theless, if a bank is satisfied that a written settlement between the ac-
count party and the beneficiary is genuine, it should be able to
For analysis of the significance and impact of the United Merchants case, see
Arora, Documentary Frauds: The United Merchants Case, 5 COMPANY LAW. 131
(1984); Hodgekiss, Banker and Customer Irrevocable Letter of Credit Bill of Lading
False and Fraudulently Made By Third Party Whether Bank Bound to Honor Letter
of Credit, 56 AUSTL. L.J. 606 (1982); Merkin, International Fraud and Documen-
tary Credits, 4 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 76 (1982); Smith, Irrevocable Letters of Credit
and Third Party Fraud: The American Accord, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 55 (1984); Note,
The International Monetary Fund Agreement and Letters of Credit: A Balancing of
Purposes, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 1061 (1983).
"2 U.C.C. § 3-305(2) makes a holder in due course subject to the defenses of:
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, duress, or illegality of the transaction, as
renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instru-
ment with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowl-
edge of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes
the instrument.
Id. A listing of proposed "real defenses" to a letter of credit would be quite different,
and that is beyond the scope of this paper.
13 See F. BEUTEL, BEUTEL'S BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 908-17
(8th ed. 1948) (the finality of payment rule for negotiable instruments was not followed
in many states before the U.C.C.).
14 A complete failure of the beneficiary to perform (e.g., no timely presentation of
documents) should result in the issuer's release of collateral to the account party and
give the account party rights against the beneficiary under the underlying contract. A
wrongful failure of the issuer to pay leaves the account party with no goods, the benefi-
ciary with no money, and the goods in a distant and perhaps unfamiliar market. If the
account party wants the goods and has the funds, a direct payment would, in all
probability, be accepted by the beneficiary despite the fact that the issuer's wrongful
dishonor constitutes a complete default by buyer under the underlying contract. A sub-
stantial increase in price, however, might change the beneficiary's willingness to accept
payment of the contract price.
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terminate its obligations and release any collateral securing the account
party's reimbursement obligation despite Clement v. F.D.LC.15 and
other case law to the contrary."6 Under any other rule the account
party is deprived of the full effect of its settlement with the beneficiary.
The decision in the Clement case, which reduced the beneficiary's re-
covery by the amount received from the account party, still deprived the
account party of its full settlement. By recognizing the settlement, the
court had already departed, as it should, from the full rigor of the inde-
pendence principle. The court should have let the issuing bank honor
the settlement if the bank had wanted to do so. Therefore, if a draw is
made on the letter of credit after termination, the issuer should be pro-
tected in paying if it has not been satisfactorily informed of the cancel-
'5 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1017 (W.D. Okla. July 9, 1986). This
case involved a standby letter of credit backing up notes issued for the purchase of oil
and gas properties from the beneficiaries. The F.D.I.C. was sued for its anticipatory
repudiation of a letter of credit issued by Penn Square Bank. The District Court re-
fused to consider that a release between the account party and the beneficiary dis-
charged the issuer. This was said to be required by the independence principle, as it
would make "the issuer's liability on the credit derivative of the account party's liability
on the underlying contract of sale." 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1030. That
statement is too broad for the facts of the case. A precise reading of the settlement
would show that an underlying agreement no longer existed. However, afraid of per-
mitting a double recovery, the court's seventh conclusion of law provided, "[tihe total
amount of the plaintiffs' claims . . . must be reduced by the value plaintiffs have re-
ceived through settlement with the account party." 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
at 1031. The court was looking at the underlying transaction, and this is permitted by
U.C.C. § 5-115(1). The court's sixteenth and nineteenth findings cover the settlement
agreement, which provided that plaintiff beneficiary's suit for the price be dismissed
with prejudice.
18 In the following cases, a beneficiary's release of the customer on the underlying
contract was held to be insufficient to relieve the issuing bank of its obligation under
the letter of credit: Asociacion De Afucarenos De Guatemala v. United States Nat'l
Bank of'Or., 423 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1970); Housing Sec. Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank,
391 A.2d 311 (Me. 1978). We feel that this is an incorrect conclusion. The settlement
in Clement apparently contained no reservation of rights against the issuer of the letter
of credit. Hence, the result will probably be that the issuer will sue the account party
for reimbursement, if no voluntary reimbursement is given. The account party probably
will then sue the beneficiary for depriving it of the benefit of the settlement and for
unjust enrichment. This creates circuity of action. In the case of accommodation parties,
the Code protects the principal debtor's settlement by discharging secondary parties
unless rights to hold the secondary party liable are expressly reserved, a rule really
designed to give the party buying a release the full protection of an unconditional re-
lease without altering the rights of the accommodation party. See M. CAMPBELL, Pro-
tection Against Indirect Attack, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 3-37 (1934).
There are also the rules of real defenses against a holder in due course. See supra
note 12. The rules do not appear to have diminished the celerity and certainty of the
use of negotiable instruments. We suggest that it would not be detrimental to the use of
letters of credit to add an unconditional discharge to the "fraud in the transaction" rule
for the protection of the account party. Drawing after a settlement with the account
party may not be fraud, but it is close to it. There would be no letters of credit if there
were no account parties; account parties, therefore, deserve some protection so that they
will keep on buying letters of credit.
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lation. If the notice of cancellation is from the account party only, then
a "may honor" rule - similar to the fraud in the transaction rule -
should apply.
Where the insolvency of a party causes a contract to fail, the rele-
vant terms of that party's insolvency system and the application of those
terms to letters of credit become most important. Malynes was quite
right: before entering into a letter of credit transaction, an account
party agreeing to cancellation should obtain a surrender of the letter or
"bee well advised" of the risk involved.
2. THE' STRICT COMPLIANCE RULE
In addition to the "independence" principle, the law of letters of
credit contains the principle of "strict compliance." As set forth in Eq-
uitable Trust Co. v. Dawson Partners Ltd.,17 the "strict compliance"
principle provides, "[tihere is no room for documents which are almost
the same, or which will do just as well."1 8 As with many quaint say-
17 27 Lloyd's Rep. 49 (H.L. 1926).
18 Id. at 52. See also Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola v. Mellon Bank Int'l,
608 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[I]t is black letter law that the terms and conditions
of a letter of credit must be strictly adhered to . . . ."); Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Dade
County, 371 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("Compliance with the terms of
a letter of credit is not like pitching horseshoes. No points are awarded for being
close."). The quoted statements should be read while keeping firmly in mind what
Lord Mansfield said over two centuries ago in Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng.
Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758): "It is a pity that reporters sometimes catch at quaint expressions
that may happen to be dropped at the Bar or the Bench; and mistake their meaning."
Id. at 457, 97 Eng. Rep. at 401. In Equitable Trust, a requirement of two certificates
from inspectors was not satisfied by a certificate from one inspector, even though he
was the only one there, because a letter of credit requires exact compliance as to
substance.
The rule of "strict compliance" holds that the beneficiary's presented documents
must comply strictly with the terms contained in the letter of credit. Does strictly mean
exactly as to verbalization or exactly as to substance? The vast majority of cases adhere
tenaciously to the rule, requiring that the credit be strictly construed and performed
precisely in accordance with its terms. See, e.g., Beyene v. Irving Trust Co., 762 F.2d 4
(2d Cir. 1985) (The misspelling of the Arabic name Sofan as "Soran" in the bill of
lading was a material discrepancy justifying dishonor of the letter of credit. The court
stated, "[Il]iteral compliance is essential so as not to impose an obligation upon the bank
that it did not undertake and so as not to jeopardize the bank's right to indemnity from
its customer."); Banco Nacional v. Mellon Bank, 726 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1984) (An
amended letter of credit called for a written notification from the seller that the goods
had arrived in the United States and the failure of such notification to be tendered was
a violation of strict compliance standards justifying the issuer's dishonor because there
was no linguistic equivalence.); Board of Trade v. Swiss Credit Bank, 728 F.2d 1241
(9th Cir. 1984) (The letter of credit requiring a bill of lading evidencing marine ship-
ment and beneficiary's tender of an airbill was not in compliance, justifying issuer's
dishonor.); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983);
Voest-Alpine Int'l Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 707 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1983);
Marino Indus. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 686 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ings contained in the reported decisions, the Equitable Trust words are
appealing, but give no reason for the rule that controls their applica-
tion. 9 A preferred alternative principle is that courts should consider
linguistic equivalency; that is, saying the same thing in different words
should satisfy strict compliance, and a legal successor of an entity
should be treated as the same entity.
2.1. Three Justifications for Strict Compliance
In justifying the "strict compliance" rule, the following questions
arise: (1) Is the rule's origin analogous to the "ribbon matching" theory
of commmon law contract that has long governed offer and accept-
ance? ° or (2) Does the rule's origin stem from banking practice where,
As Professor Dolan points out, "[tihe cases suggest that the strict-compliance rules
may be used against any party (issuer, account party, or beneficiary) who wishes to
alter the credit terms after establishment by adding or, by implication, subtracting
terms." J. DOLAN, supra note 6, at 4.08.
For further discussion of the strict compliance principle and its application, see
Dolan, Strict Compliance with Letters of Credit: Striking a Fair Balance, 102 BANK-
ING L.J. 18 (1985); Comment, Letters of Credit: A Return to the Historical Documen-
tary Compliance Standard, 46 U. PiTT. L. REv. 457 (1985); Annotation, Construc-
tion and Effect of UCC Art. 5, Dealing with Letters of Credit, 35 A.L.R.3d 1404, 1408
(1971 & Supp. 1987).
" In this connection, a recent British case provides interesting deviance to the
"strict compliance" rule. Banque de ' Indochine et de Suez v. J.H. Rayner (Mincing
Lane) Ltd., [1983] 2 W.L.R. 841, 859-60 (C.A. 1982) (Kerr, L.J. concurring). In
particular, Lord Justice Kerr stated:
For the purpose of considering this point one must assume that, at the
time when payment was agreed to be made . . . the confirming bank was
convinced that the documents did not comply with the terms of the credit
in all respects, but that the beneficiary was convinced that they did, and
that the correct answer as a matter of law was uncertain. In this connec-
tion it is interesting that it appeared from the expert evidence at the trial
that as many as two-thirds of presentations of documents against con-
firmed credits in London are thought to deviate from the terms of the
credits in some respects, but in the great majority of cases this is somehow
overcome by agreement.
20 Id. See infra Section 2.3.1. At common law, any purported acceptance which
added qualifications or conditions, even as to a trivial or immaterial detail, operated as
a counter-offer, and a rejection of the original offer. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS 68 (2d ed. 1977). As one court aptly noted, "acceptance [of an
offer] must be 'positive, unconditional, unequivocal and unambiguous' and must not
change, add to or qualify the terms of the offer." Wagner v. Rainer Mfg. Co., 230 Or.
531, 538, 371 P.2d 74, 77 (1962) (citing Shaw Wholesale Co. v. Hackbarth 102 Or.
80, 94, P. 1066, 1067 (1921). The result was a phenomenon known as the "battle of
the forms," in which each party, in essence, claimed the benefit of the terms contained
in his form over those contained in the other's form.
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code sought an armistice to the "battle"
by drafting U.C.C. § 2-207, which substantially altered the common law rule. See
Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. Killebrew, 505 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1974); Dorton v. Collins &
Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); Murray, The Chaos in the Battle of the
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with strict compliance, bankers were more certain of obtaining reim-
bursement from the account party without litigation?21 or (3) Is the
rule based on nothing more than the pragmatic considerations that the
bank clerks and lower level supervisors must initially determine com-
pliance of documents, and they must be provided with a rule that can
be easily and quickly applied?22
Of course, the strict compliance rule can be abused where consid-
erations other than the variance in the documents appear to have in-
duced the bank not to pay under its letter of credit. In the cases there
seems to be, as the First Circuit said, "some leaven in the loaf of strict
construction."2 Professor Dolan has written that some cases purport-
Forms: Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1986).
2 See infra Section 2.3.2. Super strict and ribbon matching compliance ensures
the success of a motion for summary judgment against a recalcitrant account party. We
submit that under the rule of common understanding advocated here, the same result
can be achieved, as the issue of identical legal significance of the words is a question of
law, not a question of fact for a jury. Such a rule may well result in a reduction of the
two-thirds of all "deviating" presentations in London and would assist in obtaining
agreements on the others. See supra note 19.
22 Bank clerks and lower level supervisors are people working at a level where
knowledge of the nuances of the innumerable trades and trade terms involved in the
letter of credit cannot properly be required.
See infra Section 2.3.3. The senior author has often heard the late Dean Sola
Mentschikoff advance this theory and then show that the theory is weakened when
banks advertise that their expertise in foreign trade will satisfy all of a client's banking
needs. See generally Mentschikoff, Letters of Credit: The Need for Uniform Legisla-
tion, 23 U. Cim. L. REV. 571 (1956) (United States and foreign banks do not uni-
formly employ letter of credit transaction forms).
23 Banco Espanol de Credito v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d at 234
(1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 1013 (1968). Query: Is it really "leaven" or is it
just the court's "quaint expression" stating that it finds the identical thing simply stated
in different terms?
The reference in the Banco Espanol case is indicative of the increasing recognition
of a claimed minority standard of documentary compliance known as "substantial com-
pliance." The effect of applying a standard called "substantial compliance" is to compel
issuing banks to honor letters of credit even where the presented documentation fails to
conform strictly (i.e., in haec verba) to the terms contained in the credit. For cases
giving explicit recognition to a "substantial compliance" standard, see Flagship Cruises,
Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank, 569 F.2d 699 (1st Cir. 1978) (substantial
compliance found where the letter of credit required that each draft must be accompa-
nied by "your signed statement that the draft is in conjunction with" the specified
underlying contract and the actual statement submitted stated that the letter of credit,
not the draft, was in conjunction with the specified documents); Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 116 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Okla.
1953), affd, 218 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1955) (substantial compliance not found where
the letter of credit required a "clean" bill of lading but the bill of lading actually
tendered had carrier's disclaimer for damage to goods and carrier had stamped the bill
of lading with the legend "Ship not responsible for rust"); First Nat'l Bank v. Wynne,
149 Ga. App. 811, 256 S.E.2d 383 (1979); First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 90
Ill. App. 3d 802, 413 N.E.2d 1288 (1980).
Yet many of these cases involve no more than verbalistic variations in stating what
was required. Most of the scholarly commentary is antagonistic to the use of a standard
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edly weakening the strict compliance rule should have been decided by
an application of a waiver or estoppel approach.24 Still, courts must
know that using such an approach tends to defeat any claim for reim-
bursement from the account party: the rule of estoppel is based on an
assumption that the documents tendered are not conforming, but the
bank, by its prior conduct and the potential detrimental reliance of the
account party, has precluded itself from making the assertion.2" Based
of diminished compliance in letter of credit transactions. As Farrar states: "Reasonable
compliance also frustrates the effective use of letters of credit, since those who review
documents tendered pursuant to a letter of credit will . . . be required to make subjec-
tive judgments about what is reasonable." Farrar, Letters of Credit, 38 Bus. LAW.
1169, 1174-75 (1983).
In accord is Professor Dolan, who says:
[the substantial compliance approach] does not lend itself well to the bank
letter-of-credit department, where document examiners must review the
documents against the credit and decide promptly whether to honor the
beneficiary's draft. The kind of inquiry that the minority rule commands
take more time and requires more legal analysis than document examiners
can give and more than the credit transaction can afford.
J. DOLAN, supra note 6, at 6.02. It should be noted that document examiners have
three days under U.C.C. § 5-112, whereas personnel in the collection department,
checking documents with their authority to pay, have only until the close of business on
the day of presentation under U.C.C. § 3-506.
Harfield is slightly bolder in his assessment:
The rigid rules that govern letters of credit are structural. If they are sub-
ordinated to more pliable precepts appropriate to equitable resolution of
disputes, the very existence of the letter of credit as a useful business de-
vice can be destroyed as surely as a wisteria vine can strangle an oak.
Harfield, Identity Crisis in Letter of Credit Law, 24 ARIZ. L. REv. 239, 239 (1982).
24 "In a number of situations, however, it is not necessary for the parties to deal
with the issue of strict or substantial compliance. In these cases, the issuer has waived
or ratified the defect or is estopped to assert it." Dolan, Excuse for Beneficiary Non-
performance Under a Letter of Credit: Waiver, Ratification and Estoppel, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: LETTERS OF CREDIT 183 (1986). Professor Dolan cites Temple-
Eastex Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1984) (which is discussed infra
notes 39, 44, & 54 and accompanying text) and Crocker Commercial Servs. Inc. v.
Countryside Bank, 538 F. Supp 1360 (N.D. Ill. 1981). In Crocker Commercial Servs.,
the alternate holding was an estoppel based on receipt of documents and a failure to
object to them until it was too late for a "cure." Yet it was clear that the invoices
presented, with Crocker Commercial Services as assignee, were exactly what was to be
financed. Hence, a ruling that the presentation was in compliance with the letter of
credit, despite the court's aspersions as to the nature of the bank's conduct, paved the
way for reimbursement. However, the account party was in bankruptcy. Isn't a benefi-
ciary in actual, if not strictly verbal, compliance entitled to some consideration? Where
the very risk - the account party's bankruptcy - that caused the beneficiary to re-
quire a letter of credit actually occurs, should verbalistic variations in saying the thing
requested or slight variations in translations destroy the protection? We suggest an-
swers in the negative. We do not suggest a standard of diminished compliance. With a
good bank procedure manual, compliance examination can be accomplished in a timely
manner.
25 The U.C.P. has incorporated an estoppel-type provision in Articles 16(c), (d),
and (e), requiring the issuer to give expeditious notice stating the discrepancies causing
a refusal to pay. Failure to give timely and sufficient notice precludes any claim by the
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on the three questions posed above, the authors tentatively suggest that
at least some of the cases are applications of the Latin maxim Cessante
ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.26
2.2. Example Cases
To make this point, we will apply the assumptions underlying
each of our questions to the facts of several recent cases, which we
number for purposes of subsequent reference.
Case No. 1: In Tosco Corp. v. F.D.LC. ,2' 7 the letter of credit called
for the draft to state that it was "[d]rawn under Bank of Clarksville
issuer that the documents are non-conforming. See, e.g., Apex Oil Co. v. Archem Co.,
770 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1985) (giving only one ground for rejection waives all others);
Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 1983); Crocker
Commercial Servs., Inc. v. Countryside, 538 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (silence
operates to waive only curable defects); Exchange Mutual Ins. Co. v. Commerce Union
Bank, 686 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); European Asian Bank A.G. v. Punjab
& Sind Bank (No. 2), [1983] 1 W.LR. 642 (C.A.) (citing equivalent § 8(a)-(g) of the
1974 U.C.P. version). No request by the beneficiary for a statement of the discrepan-
cies is required. In this respect, the U.C.P. differs from the terms of U.C.C. § 2-605,
which requires, on a merchant buyer's rejection, a seller's written request for a state-
ment of discrepancies only if the time for cure has passed, where the defect, as in letter
of credit documents, "is ascertainable upon reasonable inspection." U.C.C. § 2-605.
The trouble with waiver and estoppel approaches is that they leave the issuer at
the mercy of the account party, who may successfully claim no obligation to reimburse.
Since the account party selected the issuer, as between beneficiary and account party,
perhaps the waiver or estoppel should be binding on the account party in the absence of
bad faith on the part of the issuer. At any rate, consideration should be given to
whether a strict application of the strict compliance rule is used more times by banks
and account parties due to changes in circumstances not constituting a proper excuse
than to protect against improper substantive performance. The "legal equivalence" or
"substantive identity" test we propose may, in fact, cut down on unjustified refusals to
pay based on inconsequential discrepancies, thus enhancing the value of letters of
credit.
26 "The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 207 (5th ed. 1979).
27 723 F.2d 1242 (6th Cir. 1983) (There was no discussion of whether these were
real defects or whether changed conditions in the status of the beneficiary had
threatened realization on the bank's right to reimbursement.). In Forestal Mimosa Ltd.
v. Oriental Credit Ltd., [1986] 2 All E.R. 400 (C.A.), Sir John Megaw, writing for a
unanimous panel of the Court of Appeal and applying a rule of strict compliance,
found no merit in seven argued discrepancies. Two examples indicate the type of objec-
tion made. One objection was a declaration that the vessel was not under Israeli,
Taiwanese or South African flag and would not call at ports in those countries prior to
discharging at Karachi. The declaration was dated July 17, when the ship did not sail
until July 20 and could have changed its intentions in the interim but had not. Another
was that the bill of lading was signed on July 20 in Bremen, Germany and the vessel
sailed on July 20 from Beira, a port in Mozambique. The argument was that either
the dates showed a basis for questioning their genuineness or they were signed later
and antedated. On just the facts stated, the court did not regard the points as arguable.
Id. at 408. After all, radio communications do exist and where air freight is used "des-
tination issued bills" may increase in quantity of usage.
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Letter of Credit Number 105.2'' " In fact, the draft presented stated,
"[d]rawn under Bank of Clarksville, Clarksville Tennessee, letter of
Credit No. 105."'29 The recipient claimed the benefit of the "strict com-
pliance" rule due to the emphasized differences, and payment was re-
fused. The court held that payment should have been made on
presentation.
Case No. 2: In Brown v. United States Nat'l Bank30 the letter of
credit called for "a certificate that the amount drawn is due." Presented
was a signed statement that "[t]he amount drawn is due," but words
such as "I hereby certify" were not used.3" The Nebraska Supreme
Court held that payment should have been made.
Case No. 3: In American Air Lines, Inc. v. F.D.L C.,32 the letter
of credit called for a draft stating that it was drawn under the bank's
"Letter of Credit No. G-301." ' The draft presented stated that it was
drawn under "Letter of Credit G0391." The claim was made that a
mere typographical error in the digits should not destroy factual con-
formity.3 5 The court ruled that payment should have been made.
Case No. 4: In Beyene v. Irving Trust Co.,$6 the letter called for
bills of lading naming "Mohammed Sofan" as the "notify party,"
whereas the bill of lading called for notification to one "Mohammed
Soran." The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the bank
was justified in not paying.
Case No. 5: In Mount Prospect State Bank v. Marine Midland
Bank, 7 the letter of credit required bills of lading evidencing shipment
to "various Magic Automotive Products of Illinois locations in the
United States." 8 Invoices presented were to "MAP [Magic Automotive
Products] of Maryland, Sy Norman in Massachusetts" and other dif-
ferently named dealers in Magic Automotive Products. The bank's re-
fusal to pay was held proper. The documents were classified as non-
conforming.
Case No. 6: In Temple-Eastex Inc. v. Addison Bank, 9 the credit
was issued naming "Woodward, Incorporated" as the beneficiary. The
28 Tosco Corp., 723 F.2d at 1247 (emphasis added).
2 Id. (emphasis added).
'0 220 Neb. 684, 371 N.W.2d 692 (1985).
31 Id. at 688, 371 N.W.2d at 696.
32 610 F. Supp. 199 (D. Kan. 1985).
33 Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
' Id. (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 201.
6 762 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1985).
" 121 Ill. App. 3d 295, 459 N.E.2d 979 (1983).
38 Id. at 297, 459 N.E.2d at 981.
39 672 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1984).
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language, directed at Woodward, specified that the money would be
"available by your sight drafts drawn on us and accompanied by your
affidavit of default that" a named party had defaulted on invoices. 40 No
draft was presented, only a letter of demand and an affidavit, both of
which were signed by officers of Temple-Eastex Incorporated. In fact,
Temple-Eastex was the sole stockholder of Woodward and had dis-
solved Woodward into Temple-Eastex. The court held that the draw
was proper although the papers presented did not include any docu-
mentation as to the dissolution of Woodward.
2.3. Justifications for the Strict Compliance Rule and the Cases
When we consider the three questions regarding the policy under-
lying the rule of strict compliance in light of the results in these six
cases, do we gain any insight as to a consistent principle to be distilled
from all the cases?
2.3.1. The "Ribbon Matching" Justification
Under the "ribbon matching" theory of the common law, several
of these cases were wrongly decided, particularly Case Nos. 2, 3, and 6.
In each, under a literal and strict application of the language of the
letter of credit, the documents did not comply. Yet, a desirable result
was achieved in each.
In any event, the strict "ribbon matching" theory does not have
much sensible policy to support it in either the common law of con-
tract,41 or under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.4' Hence,
it should not be applied in the case of letters of credit, and certainly not
to the extent urged by counsel for the bank in Case No. 1. There, the
documents were not "almost the same" - they were the same.
2.3.2. The Reimbursement Protection Justification
The second justification for the rule of strict construction is that it
protects the issuer's ability to promptly obtain reimbursement for pay-
ment, without undue interference, from the account party or some other
source. The issuer's suit for reimbursement should depend on whether
the account party received that for which it had bargained.
In the case of letters of credit involving payment for goods, absent
a substantial change in market price or a dispute about the quality of
40 Id. at 795 (emphasis added).
41 See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 19.
42 See U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-206, 2-207.
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goods, account parties will pay to get the goods if they are still in busi-
ness. In addition, if payment is proper, the goods are usually collateral
for the reimbursement. Market price changes are, however, a risk
borne whenever collateral is accepted or goods are purchased. If the
issuer has paid, market changes should not give the account party any
excuse for refusing reimbursement where the documents are sufficient
to assure possession for the account party of the very goods called for in
documents to be submitted under the letter of credit.
If the discrepancies in the document are so insignificant that the
presented documents are, in a business sense, identical to those specified
in the letter, the issuer should be compelled to pay. The same docu-
ments will be sufficient to compel reimbursement, at least if the issuer
and account party are in the same jurisdiction, or there is a proper
choice of law clause in the issuer-account party contract. Also, the strict
construction principle should not be used to enable issuers to refuse to
pay what would otherwise be paid simply because the account party
has or is about to become insolvent. That is a risk assumed by all issu-
ers. As Malynes would have put it, the risk is one which the issuer
should "bee well advised before hee doe make" the letter of credit.
Are the problems any different in standby letters of credit?43 Once
the element of the account party's insolvency is removed from the rea-
sons which can cause the issuer to refuse payment, the remaining
problems are easier to solve. If the wording as to required documents
has the same meaning in the account party-issuer contract as the words
in the issuer-beneficiary obligation, then what satisfies one contract will
satisfy the other. Therefore, with the standby letter of credit, the reim-
bursement issue is whether the documents fully comply.
Case No. 1 was properly decided under the protection of the right
to reimbursement rule. It was drawn on the correct bank, and this fact
"8 A standby letter of credit is a credit which is not a commercial credit, and is
designed to be payable in the event of default or other non-performance by a party
obliged to the beneficiary. The event triggering payment is to be satisfied by the presen-
tation of documents. J. DOLAN, supra note 6, at A-53 (citing Republic Nat'l Bank v.
Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tex. 1978)). The Federal Reserve Board
defines a standby letter of credit as any letter of credit
which represents an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer
(i) to repay money borrowed by or advanced to or for the account of the
account party, or (ii) to make payment on account of any evidence of in-
debtedness undertaken by the account party, or (iii) to make payment on
account of any default ... by the account party in the performance of an
obligation.
12 C.F.R. § 208.8(d) (1987). Equivalent definitions are given by the Comptroller of
the Currency, 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(e) (1987), and the F.D.I.C., 12 C.F.R. § 337.2(A)
(1987).
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could not be denied by the account party.
In Case No. 2, the result is also proper, since the words "I hereby
certify" add nothing of substance to the words "the amount is due."
Both are mere representations as to a fact. Had the letter of credit
called for an affidavit, the difference would be of some significance
since a falsehood under oath can have consequences different from
those of an incorrect representation.
Case No. 3 involves merely the identification of the letter of credit
from the bank's point of view. The number of the letter of credit is of
no significance to the account party. Because the bank has three days in
which to determine the conformity or non-conformity of documents,
and because other submitted documents properly identified the account
party, the case was correctly decided.
In Case No. 4, if there was no "Soran" at the notify address and
the person at the address was the correct "notify" party, then reim-
bursement should not be affected. If this was the only issue, then, under
the "protection of the right of reimbursement" theory, the case would
have been wrongly decided. Likewise, the wrong decision would have
been reached in Case No. 5, where the bills of lading were to the in-
tended recipients.
Case No. 6 was properly decided, because the recipient of the
goods asserting default was the intended recipient of the disbursement
under the letter of credit. It was acting by a statutory successor. But
one must still ask whether the statutory succession in Temple-Eastex
changed the credit risk of the account party in the underlying contract.
It is clear that the account party has agreed to pay on documents and
adjust any warranty or other non-performance claims with the "recipi-
ent of money" in the transaction."" Should a merger or corporate disso-
lution into a sole shareholder affect that interest - to the extent that
the bank had paid - could the account party have successfully de-
fended against a claim for reimbursement? The determination to be
made is similar to those arising under the law as to delegation of con-
tract duties, where it seems that a delegation cannot be made where
credit risks are affected.45 The decisions in those cases, however, focus
44 In essence, the documentary sale or documentary draft transaction entails the
seller's use of documents embodying title to the goods and the right for delivery to be
withheld from the buyer until the buyer either pays for them or, when permitted by
instructions, signs a negotiable instrument promising to pay. J. DOLAN, supra note 6,
at 1 1.01[2]; see Chadsey, Practical Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on Docu-
mentary Letter of Credit Transactions, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 618 (1954). The same
effect also results where the sale is C.I.F. except that the time for examination of the
C.I.F. draft with documents is far shorter. See U.C.C. § 2-320(4).
45 See, e.g., Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N.Y. 8 (1875); British Waggon Co. and Park-
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on a delegation of full performance. The issue here is a delegation of
the right to receive a default payment. The case is not unlike the case
where a creditor has assigned rights to payment to a bank, and pay-
ment in full has been made before discovery of a latent defect in the
goods sold. Upon discovery of the defect, no right of recovery against
the assignee bank exists, and the debtor-obligor's rights of recovery still
exist against the original creditor's successors, as there had been a suc-
cession." Hence, under the principle of protecting the right of reim-
bursement, Temple-Eastex was correctly decided.
2.3.3. The Pragmatic Banking Justification
The key problem arises under the third justification: whether,
pragmatically, there is a bright-line rule capable of being applied by
the personnel examining documents for the banks. In our six cases, the
courts ruled that payment should have been made in four: Nos. 1, 2, 3,
and 6. In Nos. 4, and 5, the courts held that non-payment by the bank
was justified, although neither of the first two justifications seem to
justify the action.
The cases seem justified under the third justification. While bank
personnel cannot be expected to know whether there is any trade differ-
ence between "coromandel ground nuts" and "machine shelled ground-
nut kernels, '47 or "[d~ried grapes" and "raisins," ' they can be ex-
gate Waggon Co. v. Lea & Co., 5 Q.B.D. 149 (1880). It was traditionally the general
rule that rights arising out of a contract were non-delegable if they were coupled with
liabilities, or if they involved a relationship of personal credit and confidence. See, e.g.,
Paige v. Faure, 229 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E. 898 (1920); cf. Nassau Hotel Co. v. Barnett &
Barse Corp., 162 A.D. 381, 147 N.Y.S. 283 (App. Div.), affd mem., 212 N.Y. 568,
106 N.E. 1036 (1914). See generally E. MURPHY & R. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CON-
TRACT LAW 1281-95 (3d ed. 1984). The contemporary rule holds a duty to be non-
delegable where the risk of proper performance by the delegate would vary materially
from performance by the obligor. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 19, at 663
(citing U.C.C. § 2-210(1) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 150(2),
151(2) (1981)).
46 We use "succession" here to indicate succeeding to title through operation of
law, as on death or by corporate merger, but not a consensual transfer to a different
legal entity or a custodial transfer as in the case of an equity receivership.
"' See J.H. Rayner & Co., [1942] 2 All E.R. 694; Oilseeds Trading Co. v. Ham-
bros Bank, Ltd., [1943] 1 K.B. 37.
"8 Bank of Italy v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 236 N.Y. 106, 110, 140 N.E. 211, 212,
cert. denied, 264 U.S. 581 (1923); see also National City Bank v. Seattle Nat'l Bank,
121 Wash. 476, 209 P. 705 (1922) (where the letter of credit required payment for
"standard white granulated sugar," bank held not obliged to pay upon tender of in-
voices covering "granulated white sugar, Java No. 24, direct polarization, 98.5 percent"
because the differences might indicate two different grades in the trade). But see
Laudisi v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 146 N.E. 347 (1924) (where
letter of credit called for "Alicante Bouchez grapes," but the bill of lading merely speci-
fied "grapes," the documents were conforming); Bank of New York & Trust Co. v.
[Vol. 9:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss4/1
LETTERS OF CREDIT
pected to know that there is no difference between "Letter of Credit
Number 105" and "letter of Credit No. 105." Bank personnel can also
be held to know that "Bank of Clarksville" and "Bank of Clarksville,
Clarksville, Tennessee," are one and the same, especially when it is
their own bank. Nevertheless, in Case No. 5 the court correctly deter-
mined that bank personnel could not be expected to know that "Sy
Norman in Massachusetts" was another name for "Magic Automotive
Products of Illinois." Nor, when foreign names are involved, would it
have been appropriate to hold in No. 4 that bank clerks should know
that "Soran" is a typographical error for "Sofan." However, if the two
did sound alike, should a court, which customarily applies the doctrine
of idem sonans49 to determine the effectiveness of a recorded deed ap-
ply that rule to foreign names in a letter of credit, or indeed to any
names in a letter of credit? Real estate title searches are conducted in a
more leisurely fashion by trained researchers with transactional time to
investigate such discrepancies. The practice in letters of credit is quite
different. The documents must be examined and the bank must make a
rapid decision. The allotted time is short: a decision must be made and
a dispatch sent before the close of business on the third day after pre-
sentment.50 The fees are not large and electronic inquiry is inexpensive.
Atterbury Bros., 226 A.D. 117, 234 N.Y.S. 442 (App. Div. 1929), affd, 253 N.Y. 569,
171 N.E. 786 (1930) (Letter of credit specifying "casein" was satisfied by shipping
documents for "underground casein.").
"' Sounding the same or alike; having the same sound. A term applied to
names which are substantially the same, though slightly varied in spelling,
... Under the rule of 'idem sonans,' variance between allegation and
proof of a given name is not material if the names sound the same or the
attentive ear finds difficulty in distinguishing them when pronounced.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 670 (5th ed. 1979).
The doctrine exists with respect to recording acts. A recorded document under a
name spelled differently from the true spelling of a party's name is still constructive
notice to one searching the title of a party under the party's correctly spelled name, if
the usual pronunciation sounds the same ("Broun" and "Brown", for example). The
Russell Index System was devised to place all such names together by subdivisions in
the indices under the order in which certain liquid consonants appear. See Leary &
Blake, Twentieth Century Real Estate Business and Eighteenth Century Recording, 22
AM. U.L. REv. 275, 285 n.35 (1973).
80 U.C.C. 5-112 states in part:
(1) A bank to which a documentary draft or demand for payment is
presented under a credit may without dishonor of the draft, demand or
credit
(a) defer honor until the close of the third banking day following
receipt of the documents; and
(b) further defer honor if the presenter has expressly or impliedly
consented thereto.
The U.C.P., in article 16(c), only prescribes a "reasonable time" which, depending
upon the circumstances, could be far shorter or perhaps somewhat longer. See generally
Ellinger, The Uniform Customs Their Nature and the 1983 Revision, 1984 LLOYDS
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Hence, the rules for compliance and non-compliance could be called
rules for determining the obvious, in light of the understanding and
vocabularies of ordinary bank clerks and supervisors with a modicum of
training.
On this basis, the courts should consider whether the documents
presented are, under a typical bank inspection, the identical things
called for by the letter of credit.5" Thus, in Case No. 3, the issue is
MAR. & COM. L.Q. 578. The authors have seen standby letters of credit requiring that
the beneficiary receive to its credit "actual and finally collected funds" within 60 min-
utes of the presentation of documents, the credit usually being to an account with the
paying bank, often also the issuing bank. If the credit is subject to both the U.C.C. and
the U.C.P., the outside time limitation is that set forth by the U.C.C. See Bank of
Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), affd, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986). But the freedom of contract permits a con-
tractual shortening of the time for payment.
5 The language of a letter of credit is strictly construed against the issuer, or, in
some cases, the drafter (if other than the issuer). See, e.g., Banque Paribas v. Hamilton
Indus. Int'l, Inc., 767 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985) (ambiguities over whether the standby
letter of credit incorporated, as per the underlying contract, a guarantee which may
have been violated under Saudi Arabian law, was construed against drafter); Marino
Indus. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 686 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The
corollary to the rule of strict compliance is that the requirements in the letter of credit
must be explicit . . . and that all ambiguities are construed against the bank. Since the
beneficiary must comply strictly with the requirements of the letter, the beneficiary
must know precisely and unequivocally what those requirements are."); East Girard
Say. Ass'n v. Citizens Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1979) (The
bank attempted to draft a guaranty letter of credit on a form designed for a letter of
credit involving a sale of merchandise, thereby making the attempt to specify required
accompanying documents meaningless. The ambiguity over accompanying documents
was resolved against the bank drafter, and no accompanying documents were found by
the court to be required.); Bank of Cochin Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
612 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (against the party providing the language); United
States Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 83 Civ. 4966 (S.D.N.Y. July
2, 1984) (against issuer); West Virginia Hous. Dev. Fund v. Stroka, 415 F. Supp. 1107
(W.D. Pa. 1976) (against issuer); Travis Bank & Trust Co. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 851
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (against beneficiary drafter); Banco Espanol de Credito v. State
St. Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 237 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013
(1968) (quoting Fair Pavilions, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 24 A.D.2d 109, 112, 264
N.Y.S.2d 255, 258 (1965), rev'd, 19 N.Y.2d 512, 227 N.E.2d 839, 281 N.Y.S.2d 23
(1967)) (Courts should construe the language of the credit "as strongly against the
issuer as a reasonable reading will justify.").
Professor Dolan notes, however, that the issuer of the credit is not always the
drafter of its terms. Rather, the customer and the beneficiary usually negotiate some of
the provisions of the credit. J. DOLAN, supra note 6, at T 4.08[3]. He concludes that,
"[a] general review of the cases indicates that some courts construe the ambiguous
credit against the drafter and that some construe it against the issuer." Id.
Minimizing conflicting interpretations and potential litigation requires avoiding
ambiguity by thoughtful drafting, while keeping in mind the rule of strict construction
against the issuer and/or drafter. The parties can draft a letter of credit to best serve
the particular circumstances of their transaction. See Comment, "Unless Otherwise
Agreed" and Article 5: An Exercise in Freedom of Contract, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 416
(1967). However, the credit should be carefully prepared to reflect the needs of the
parties including the beneficiary and to protect the interests of the issuer. See Del
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whether a wrong number on the letter of credit would preclude a cost
effective examination of the documents. If the files of the bank's letter
of credit department are in numerical order only, and if the number
calls up an obviously incorrect file, or is of a letter not yet issued, the
issue is whether the filing system was designed with reasonable care if
it lacks cross-indices by name of account party and beneficiary. The
problem is similar to the problem of the computerized processing of
stop orders on checks,52 except that the gross transactional volume in
Duca, Pitfalls of "Boiler Plating" Letters of Credit, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 3 (1980); see also,
Kozolchyk The Letter of Credit in Court: An Expert Testifies, 99 BANKING L.J. 340
(1982).
Specifically, we point out here that a "clean on-board bill of lading" is not ren-
dered nonconforming because noted thereon is a record of a subsequent unloading by
reason of damage caused by a fire on the vessel. See M. Golodetz & Co. v. Czarnikow
Rionda Co., Inc., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 495 (C.A.) (Sir John Megaw). The ruling was that
the notation must bear on the condition of the goods at the time of loading, a point not
entirely clear from the first reading of U.C.P. art. 34(b) (1983), which states, "Banks
will refuse transport documents bearing such clauses or notations unless the credit ex-
pressly stipulates the clauses or notations which may be accepted. But the phrase "such
clauses" refers to U.C.P. art. 34(a), which reads, "A clean transport document is one
which bears no superimposed clause or notation which expressly declares a defective
condition of the goods and/or the packaging." But these refer to conditions at the time
of loading, as does article 26(a)(ii), defining a marine bill of lading. And article 34(c)
provides, "[blanks will regard a requirement in a credit for a transport document to
bear the clause 'clean on board' as complied with if such document meets the require-
ments of this article and of article 27(b)." For a discussion of the 1983 revisions to the
U.C.P., see Byrne, The 1983 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice for Docu-
mentary Credits, 102 BANKING L.J. 151 (1985); Cannon, The Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits: The 1983 Revision, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 42 (1984);
Chapman, The 1983 Revisions to the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits, 90 COM. L.J. 13 (1985).
52 Bank computers were originally programmed to "kick out" stopped items only
by reading the amount of checks to be stopped to the exact penny. As such, several
early courts, following the pre-computer precedents of minor errors, found banks liable
for failure to stop payment on items. See, e.g., Rimburg v. Union Trust Co. of D.C., 12
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 527 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1973) (Where drawer's stop or-
der listed the amount of the check as being for $235.00 instead of $250.00, the bank
was held liable, inter alia, for failure to explain to the payor that the computer would
only "kick out" the check to be stopped based on the amount being correctly stated); see
also Delano v. Putnam Trust Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 635 (Conn. 1981)
(Where the amount stated in the stop order was $555.30, but the check was for
$455.30, the bank was held liable for the failure to stop.); Pokras v. National Bank of
N. Am., 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1089 (N.Y. App. Term 1981) (two cent
error by customer, bank liable); Elisie Rodriguez Fashions, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 133 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (Where the amount
was given as $1804.10 instead of $1804.00, the bank was held liable for failure to
stop.); Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers Nat'l Bank, 86 Misc. 2d 284, 381
N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976) (Bank was held liable for failure to stop where
check number was given as 221 instead of 222, with all information correctly stated.).
Banks argue that present computerized processing of checks requires the exact amount
and the customer's error should not be charged to the bank. Proper programming can
result in a "kick out" of checks with minor variations. See Migden v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 937 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981) (variations up to a
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any one bank in letters of credit would be far less than that of checks.
In any event, proper file searching can be expected of bank personnel.
If cross indexing is unduly expensive, the banks must plead and prove
their case on the need for proper letter of credit numbers on the sub-
mitted document. In Case No. 3, this was not done.
This leaves Case No. 2 and Case No. 6. These cases depend upon
the extent of quasi-legal training that should be expected of the docu-
ment examiners and reviewers in a letter of credit department. If there
is no legal difference between a signed paper saying, "the amounts are
due," and one, also signed, saying, "I hereby certify that the amounts
are due," simple training can make that clear. It is true that the word
"certify" preceding the statement may give a greater aura of formality,
but it does not in fact add to the legal effect. Such a determination
certainly would require some examination of the content of the
presented documents, but no more than is called for by Article 23 of the
Uniform Customs and Practices."3 Nor is it difficult to require that
bank personnel find a facial compliance between the text of a usual
document and what is called for in the letter of credit; this requirement
may easily be added to personnel training manuals. Deep reading of
complicated documents beyond the initial paragraphs should not be
required.
The same approach determines what meaning is to be given to the
term "draft" in a letter of credit. Unless specified to be a "negotiable
draft," any demand for payment should suffice. This also is not too
difficult a concept for bank personnel to keep in mind.
More difficult is the issue of drawing by and certifying by a suc-
ten-dollar variation programmable). Banks should be required to program for customer
convenience. See J. VERGARI & V. SHUE, CHECKS, PAYMENTS, AND ELECTRONIC
BANKING 438 (1986). So too in letters of credit, if the number of the letter is the cause
of the dishonor, banks should program their retrieval systems for the customer's conve-
nience and include a customers' name index.
5 See, e.g., U.C.P. art. 37(b) (stating that the amount of the insurance document
must at least equal the value of the goods plus 10%, but if that cannot be determined,
the insurance amount must cover the greater of the amount drawn or the amount of the
commercial invoice); cf. Id. at art. 39 (stating that where an insurance document is to
cover all risks, the tendered document must be examined). U.C.P. art. 23, on the ac-
ceptance of certain documents "as presented," now has an added proviso, which reads:
[B]anks will accept such documents as presented, provided that their data
content makes it possible to relate the goods and/or services referred to
therein to those referred to in the commercial invoice(s) presented, or to
those referred to in the credit if the credit does not stipulate presentation
of a commercial invoice.
Finally, U.C.P. art. 15 requires examination of all documents presented for inconsis-
tency. It states: "Documents which appear on their face to be inconsistent with one
another will be considered as not appearing on their face to be in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the credit."
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cessor corporation where no insolvency is involved. Temple-Eastex Inc.
v. Addison Bank and its progeny have permitted the draw and the
certificate by the successor." The right to draw is a contingent, intangi-
ble asset of the beneficiary, ripening into a direct asset when the benefi-
ciary has performed the underlying contract. The issue really is
whether, in addition to presenting its demand for payment, there
should also be some documentation of the presenter's succession to the
position of the beneficiary.
In this era of corporate takeovers, the determination of whether
the successor corporation becomes a legal successor of the beneficiary, a
transferee of the credit, or a mere assignee of the beneficiary's right to
the proceeds is an important one, and one on which there is scant au-
thority in letter of credit law. For the application of the third justifica-
tion of the rule, the first concern is whether, on receipt of a present-
ment with documentation alleged to show successorship, bank personnel
should have some procedure to determine whether to pay or to consult
counsel on the matter. If a negotiable draft or certificate - drawn by
one other than the named beneficiary without documentation of the
succession - is presented, then by analogy to U.C.C. § 3-505(1)(b),
the issuer should be able to demand, without dishonor, "reasonable
identification of the person making presentment and evidence of his au-
thority to make it."55 Also, as is prescribed in U.C.C. § 3-505(2), the
672 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1984) (parent corporation allowed to draw under credit
in favor of dissolved subsidiary and to present its own affidavit in lieu of one by subsid-
iary); Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 757 F.2d 399
(1st Cir. 1985); F.D.I.C. v. Bank of Boulder, 622 F.Supp. 288 (D. Colo. 1985) (rights
go to State Banking Commissioner and F.D.I.C. as receiver, but F.D.I.C. as receiver
cannot transfer rights to F.D.I.C. as corporation); Pastor v. National Republic Bank,
56 II. App. 3d 421, 371 N.E.2d 1127 (1977), affd, 76 Ill. 2d 139, 390 N.E.2d 894
(1979) (state insurance superintendent allowed to draw against credit in favor of insur-
ance company in liquidation). But see In re Swift Aire Lines, 30 Bankr. 490, 496 (9th
Cir. 1983) (Statement signed by bankruptcy trustee for beneficiary failed to comply
with credit requiring statement signed by beneficiary's corporate secretary.). See discus-
sion infra text at notes 101-45.
55 U.C.C. § 3-202. This section states:
(1) The party to whom presentment is made may without dishonor
require
(a) exhibition of the instrument; and
(b) reasonable identification of the person making presentment and
evidence of his authority to make it if made for another; and
(c) that the instrument be produced for acceptance or payment at a
place specified in it, or if there be none at any place reasonable in
the circumstances; and
(d) a signed receipt on the instrument for any partial or full pay-
ment and its surrender upon full payment.
(2) Failure to comply with any such requirement invalidates the present-
ment but the person presenting has a reasonable time in which to comply
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presenter should be given a reasonable time to comply with the identifi-
cation requirement, which might extend beyond the expiry date if the
original presentation is on time. Succession should be treated separately
from a transfer or an assignment, both of which are in the nature of
consensual transfers. Succession should not require the consent of the
issuer, which the issuer could withhold without reason if the credit po-
sition of the account party had worsened.5 Where the transaction in-
volves a different party signing an affidavit or statement as to default, a
distinction might be drawn based on the implied trust in the integrity of
a specially indicated required signer.
There should be some limit to the extent bank personnel are ex-
pected to apply legal conclusions to documents presented. However, an
English court did expect bank personnel to know that the character of a
"clean on board bill of lading" was not destroyed by a notation of the
damage to the cargo after it was loaded and partially off-loaded.5"
Cases that treat a beneficiary's demand for payment as satisfying a call
for a "draft," and treat a statement as satisfying a call for a "certifi-
cate" require a certain training in the legal significance of commonly
used terms so that the exact legal equivalence of documents commonly
presented can be determined. This exact legal equivalence doctrine
should not extend to documents not commonly presented, or to specified
signatories. It can, however, extend to training to consult counsel on
matters of legal succession, or what we might call "entity equivalence."
2.4. The Correct Strict Compliance Rationale
Based on the foregoing analysis, we may conclude that the reason
for the doctrine of strict compliance is that bank personnel should not
and the time for acceptance or payment runs from the time of compliance.
Id.; see, e.g., Wright v. Bank of Cal. 276 Cal. App. 2d 485, 490-91, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11,
15 (1969) (The Court stated that U.C.C. § 3-505 rights are permissive, and the pur-
pose of the section generally is to permit the party to whom presentment is made to
exercise these rights without being liable for dishonor.). In other words, it is not com-
pulsory to inquire into the authority of the drawer, but where a succession is shown,
commerce will be aided by such an inquiry.
58 See AMF Head Sports Wear, Inc. v. Ray Scott's All American Sports Club,
Inc., 448 F.Supp. 222 (D. Ariz. 1978) (holding that the issuing bank of a letter of
credit is under no duty to amend the credit even when requested to do so by both the
customer and the beneficiary). The court, quoting Kozolchyk, noted: "The customs and
practice of banking usage ... permit an Issuing Bank absolute discretion in determin-
ing whether to issue an amended letter of credit, notwithstanding the request or agree-
ment to such amendment by both the Bank's customer and the beneficiary." The court
concluded that neither good faith nor usage of trade imposes a duty upon the defendant
bank to amend a letter of credit. Id. at 224-35.
11 M. Golodetz & Co. v. Czarnikow Rionda Co., Inc., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 495
(C.A.) (Sir John Megaw).
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be placed in the position of having to determine anything except
whether, given common variations in usage of words and some basic
training as to the legal effect of commonly used documents and legal
successors, the identical thing required has been presented.
We suggest that there should not be a bifurcated standard. Rather,
the rule should be that where bank personnel have released payment
under a letter of credit, there should be a presumption that the papers
which were accepted as complying documents were in fact the identical
things required by the language of the letter of credit, or were things
required by operation of law to be treated as identical. The account
party could, of course, rebut the presumption. When the bank does not
pay under a letter of credit, the aggrieved party should be required to
demonstrate that what was presented and what was specified in the
letter of credit were essentially identical.
3. THE EFFECT OF INSOLVENCY
Against this background of the independence principle and what
may be called the "linguistic equivalency/compliance principle," we
can now discuss the insolvency problems and the essential need that
any issuer of letters of credit - especially standby letters - "bee well
advised before he doe make them." We assume here that despite the
insolvency of a party, a proper presentation of documents can be made
in compliance with the foregoing discussion. Specifically, we must de-
termine whether the insolvency of any one or two of the parties re-
quires a different result than the one reached under our foregoing in-
terpretation of the rules of compliance.
3.1. Beneficiary Insolvency
First, we consider the result should the beneficiary become insol-
vent. 8 May the beneficiary's representative in insolvency draw on an
"8 We assume here that the representative in insolvency has not rejected, as an
executory contract, either the letter or the underlying contract.
One of the three theories advanced in the Twist Cap complaint was that the letters
of credit were executory contracts that the debtor could reject. See Chaitman & Sovern,
supra note 2, at 30. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a bankrupt may reject executory
contracts with court approval. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1986) (which
provides, in pertinent part: "Except as provided . . . in subsection (b), (c), and (d) of
this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any execu-
tory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."). While the Bankruptcy Code does not
define "executory," the term is generally accepted to mean "a contract under which the
obligations, of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unper-
formed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material
breach excusing the performance of the other." Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973); see also THC Financial
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outstanding letter of credit? The answer is in the affirmative. Should
the stage of the beneficiary's performance of the underlying contract
make any difference in the matter? Should the differences between
straight credits and negotiation credits have any significance? Answers
in the negative to these last two questions are suggested.
Letters of credit are issued in two different categories: straight
credits and negotiation credits. This distinction merely gives rights to
those included in the negotiation clause of the letter of credit to collect
in their own right, rather than as agent for the beneficiary. 59 Thus, this
distinction should have no bearing on the right of the insolvency repre-
sentative to draw, as the insolvency representative draws, in the right of
the beneficiary rather than as an agent. A problem might exist, how-
Corp. v. Osborne, 686 F.2d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 1982) (same definition); In re Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific R.R. Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 604 F.2d 1002, 1004 (7th Cir.
1979) (same definition); Jensen v. Continental Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 481 (8th Cir.
1979); In re Lake Minnewaska Mountain House, Inc., 23 Bankr. 2d 326, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Once the credit is fully established as to the account party, the credit thereafter
becomes a fixed obligation between the bank and the beneficiary. What might be af-
fected by the account party's bankruptcy are the issuer's right to realize on any collat-
eral or to effectively recover reimbursement. But these factors do not affect the benefi-
ciary even though they do assure the most microscopic examination of the presentation
for discrepancies. In cases of known account party bankruptcy, the beneficiary would
"bee well advised before hee doe make" a presentation, to scrupulously conform the
documents.
11 A straight credit is that credit which requires that drafts be signed by a desig-
nated party, which is usually its authorized agent. The credit usually contains language
such as, "Drafts must clearly specify the number of this advice and be presented at this
company not later than . . . ." or, "We undertake that all drafts drawn and presented
to us as above specified will be duly honored." J. DOLAN, supra note 6, at A-54; see
also Dixon, Iramos & CIA v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 144 F.2d 759, 760 n.1 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1944); Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage &
Fin. Corp., 44 Ill. App. 3d 220, 357 N.E.2d 1307 (1976); Mid-States Mortgage Corp.
v. National Bank, 77 Mich. App. 651, 653, 259 N.W.2d 175, 176 (1977).
A negotiation credit is one "under which the issuers" engagement runs to drawers,
endorsers and bona fide holders of drafts drawn under the credit or under which the
issuer indicates expressly that the credit is available via negotiation. J. DOLAN, supra
note 6, at A-47; see INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, STANDARD FORMS
FOR ISSUING DOCUMENTARY CREDITS 10 (1978) (ICC Pub. No. 323).
The principal distinction between the two types of credits is that in the straight
credit, the engagement runs to the beneficiary, while in the negotiation credit, the en-
gagement runs to "drawers, endorsers, and bona fide holders." J. DOLAN, supra note
6, at 1 8.02[6]. The straight credit conveys no commitment or obligation to parties other
than the named beneficiary. See Eriksson v. Refiners Export Co., 264 A.D. 525, 35
N.Y.S.2d 829, reh'g denied, 265 A.D. 804, 37 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 1942). The
negotiation credit, on the other hand, extends the issuer's engagement, on specified con-
ditions, to third parties who have purchased the beneficiary's drafts to be presented
under the credit. Ryan General Principles and Classifications of Letters of Credit, in
1985 PRAC. L. INST., LETTERS OF CREDIT AND BANKERS' ACCEPTANCES 11, 52-53
(C. Mooney ed.). For further elaboration on the two types of credits, and their distin-
guishing characteristics, see J. DOLAN, supra note 6, at 10.02[2]-10.03; Harfield,
Identity Crisis in Letter of Credit Law, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 239, 246-248 (1982).
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ever, in the case of a straight credit where the draw is by a successor.
When the letter does not state it is transferable, it is therefore non-
transferable under both the U.C.C.60 and the Uniform Customs and
Practices.61
This general non-transferability principle in letter of credit law
seems to stipulate that only the named beneficiary may draw unless
agreement otherwise is specifically set forth. The justifications proposed
for the rule lack substance in today's world; they may be remnants of a
time when any transfer of an intangible was believed to involve cham-
perty and maintenance."2 The old justification - that the account
party reposes special confidence in the beneficiary and that permitting
others to draw on the letter of credit would betray that trust - will not
withstand scrutiny when it is applied to every non-transferable letter
6o U.C.C. § 5-116(1) states, "[t]he right to draw under a credit can be transferred
or assigned only when the credit is expressly designated as transferable or assignable."
See National Bank & Trust Co. of N. Am., Ltd. v. J.L.M. Int'l, Inc., 421 F.Supp.
1269, 1272-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments, 311
Minn. 452, 250 N.W.2d 172 (1977); Eberth & Ellinger, Assignment and Presentation
of Documents in Commercial Credit Transactions, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 277 (1982); Mc-
Gowan, Assignability of Documentary Credits, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 666
(1948); Ufford, Transfer and Assignment of Letters of Credit Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 7 WAYNE L. REV. 263 (1960).
61 U.C.P. art. 56(b) states: "A credit can be transferred only if it is expressly
designated as 'transferable' by the issuing bank. Terms such as 'divisible,' 'fractionable,'
'assignable,' and 'transmissible' add nothing to the meaning of the term 'transferable'
and shall not be used." Id.
61 At early common law, any attempted assignment or transfer of a contract right
was ordinarily held ineffective. This was particularly true with respect to intangibles
- choses in action - which could not be effectively assigned. 1 GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.3 (1965). Thus, Lord Coke stated:
And first was observed the great wisdom and policy of the sages and foun-
ders of our law, who have provided that no possibility, right, title, nor
thing in action, shall be granted or assigned to strangers, for that would be
the occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits, of great oppression of
the people, and chiefly of terre-tenants, and the subversion of the due and
equal execution of justice.
Lampet's Case, 10 Coke 46b, 48a (1612), 77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997 (K.B. 1613); see
Glenn, The Assignment of Choses in Action: Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser, 20 VA.
L. REV. 621, 636 (1934) ("In other words, Coke attributed the rule, that choses in
action are not assignable, to outside pressure."). As Calamari & Perillo aptly noted,
The history of the law of assignments is an interesting illustration of the
struggle between commercial needs and the tenacity of legal conceptual-
ism. The common law developed when wealth was primarily land, and,
secondarily, chattels. Intangibles hardly mattered. In a developed economy,
however, wealth is primarily represented by intangibles: bank accounts,
securities, accounts receivable, etc. The free alienability of these assets is
essential to commerce.
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, at 633. See Coogan & Gordon, The Effect
of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Receivables Financing - Some Answers and
Some Unsolved Problems, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1529, 1530 (1963).
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where the transfer involves no changed credit risk.
Any draw must be accompanied by the documents which the ac-
count party has specified in the letter of credit. Any confidence reposed
in the beneficiary relates only to those documents which are, in a com-
mercial letter of credit, turned over to the account party. If the payment
gives the account party title to the goods and discharges the payment
obligation under the underlying contract, all possible interests of the
account party are satisfied. Any claim that a transfer will prevent the
account party from asserting offsets against the beneficiary ignores the
independence principle and the underlying concept of the documentary
sale.6" The commitment of the issuing bank is to pay the sum specified
in, or computed in accordance with, the letter of credit. Even if the
beneficiary were the drawer and the account party had offsets, the off-
sets could no more be asserted through the issuing bank than any other
defenses, absent "fraud in the transaction," illegality, or evidence satis-
factory to the issuer of an unconditional cancellation of the underlying
contract.
The next inquiry is whether the issuing bank has any interests
that might be involved. Professor Dolan suggests that credit issuers
should not be forced to inquire at length into the authority of the
drawer; such an obligation would diminish "the celerity of transac-
tions" and cause the acceptability of credits to suffer."' He does not
suggest that an issuer is denied the right to so inquire should it so
desire. Most beneficiaries are corporations, and most letters of credit do
not specify who is to sign the draw on behalf of the beneficiary. Hence,
issuers must rely on the warranty that the beneficiary has complied
with all conditions of the credit.65 This warranty, however, requires
63 In documentary sales, offsets and breaches of warranty are to be settled by
independent suit when conforming documents are tendered. For example, Farrar states
"Disputes concerning performance or other matters between seller and buyer (benefi-
ciary and account party) have to be worked out between themselves." Farrar, Judicial
Intervention, in 1986 PRAC. L. INST., LETTERS OF CREDIT & BANKERS' ACCEPT-
ANCES 651, 654. Professor Clark concurs, saying:
[I]f the buyer fears that the ... shipment of goods will be non-con-
forming, he cannot raise. . . breach of warranty as a defense to payment
of the price; the buyer's bank is under a primary obligation to pay the
draft so long as the documents conform to the requirements of the letter.
Thus, the burden of suit is shifted, and the buyer must go after the seller
B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS 8.111]
(1981 & Supp. 1986).
6 See Dolan, Transfer and Assignment of Letters of Credit and Rights Thereun-
der in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: LETTERS OF CREDIT 240 (1986).
15 U.C.C. § 5-111 provides:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed the beneficiary by transferring or presenting a
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that the beneficiary transfer or present the credit, which would not
have been done had the draft or demand for payment been forged. In
the usual case, the issuing bank may well be relying on the Articles 3
and 4 warranties of the presenting bank.66 But because this may only
be a warranty of "no knowledge" of forged or unauthorized drawer's
signature to a payor bank, the warranty is a slender reed to rely upon.
The same reliance could be made on presentation warranties by the
documentary draft or demand for payment warrants to all interested par-
ties that the necessary conditions of the credit have been complied with.
This is in addition to any warranties arising under Articles 3, 4, 7, and 8.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed a negotiating, advising, confirming, collecting
or issuing bank presenting or transferring a draft or demand for payment
under a credit warrants only the matters warranted by a collecting bank
under Article 4 and any such bank transferring a document warrants only
the matters warranted by an intermediary under Articles 7 and 8.
Under U.C.C. § 5-111(1), the warranties made by a beneficiary will be the same
as warranties made by any other presenter or transferor. U.C.C. § 5-111(1), official
comment. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417, 4-207, 7-507, 7-508, 8-306. Where a credit requires
that a demand for payment be made by a beneficiary's draft drawn on the issuer, the
beneficiary, by presenting the draft to the issuer, warrants to the issuer that it is the
draft of the beneficiary. For further coverage of the U.C.C. § 5-111 warranties and
their application, see Fox, Performance under the Letter of Credit: Presentation of
Documents by the Beneficiary and Payment by the Issuer, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY: LETTERS OF CREDIT 142 (1985); J. DOLAN, supra note 6, at 9.04.
e The Article 3 warranty is U.C.C. § 3-417(1) which states: I
(1) Any person who obtains payment or acceptance of any prior transferor
warrants to a person who in good faith pays or accepts that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain
payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title; and
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer
is unauthorized, except that this warranty is not given by a holder
in due course acting in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature,
whether or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course took
the draft after the acceptance or obtained the acceptance
without knowledge that the drawer's signature was unautho-
rized; and
(c) the instrument has not been materially altered, except that this
warranty is not given by a holder in due course acting in good faith
(i) to the maker of a note; or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is also
the drawee; or
(iii) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration
made prior to the acceptance if the holder in due course took
the draft after the acceptance, even though the acceptance
provided "payable as originally drawn" or equivalent terms;
or
(iv) to an acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration
made after the acceptance.
The Article 4 warranty is U.C.C. § 4-207(1) and is substantially the same.
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insolvency representative of the beneficiary.
The analysis may be different where the insolvency representative
executes documents required by the letter of credit, and the account
party's application required the documents to be executed by another
individual.67 First we must ask, what of the right to draw? We have
already discussed the problem of a draw by a successor under a plan of
voluntary liquidation.6" Should not the position of a statutory successor
in liquidation be even stronger? In many areas, a statutory successor
succeeds where a mere assignee or even a court-appointed receiver
would not. For example, where the beneficiary was an insurance com-
pany that was in the hands of a state insurance liquidator, the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that the state insurance liquidator could properly
draw under the letter of credit.69 Where the letter of credit referred to
the Imperial Government of Iran, draws by agencies of the succeeding
Islamic Republic were ruled to be proper. 0 So too, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.), in its capacity as receiver for a failed
bank beneficiary, has been able to draw.7 ' As a receiver in insolvency,
the F.D.I.C. customarily draws in the name of the beneficiary by its
liquidator, titling itself as such. A federal district court, however, has
held that the F.D.I.C. as liquidator cannot transfer the right to draw
under a non-transferable credit to the F.D.I.C. in its corporate
capacity.
72
Including Temple-Eastex Inc. v. Addison Bank,73 the precedent
seems to allow the transfer of a beneficiary's drawing rights to a succes-
sor under corporate law, and governmental de facto successors under
insurance company insolvency law and banking insolvency law.
Should federal bankruptcy proceedings reach a different result? In
In re Swift Aire Lines,4 the Bankruptcy Panel of the Ninth Circuit
"7 See supra text at accompanying note 3 (discussing In Re Swift Aire Lines,
Inc.); see infra text accompanying note 72.
68 See supra text accompanying notes 39-40, 44 & 54 (discussing Temple-Eastex
Inc. v. Addison Bank).
6 Pastor v. National Republic Bank, 76 Ill. 2d 139, 390 N.E.2d 894 (1979). See
also Letters of Credit and the Insolvent Beneficiary: The Non-Assignability Provision
of the Uniform Commercial Code Makes a Curious First Impression - Pastor v.
Nat'l Republic Bank, 4 LENDING L.F. 3 (1980).
70 American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Bank of Iran, 474 F.Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). This case was one of a host of cases that ensued as a result of the revolution in
Iran. See generally Barrett, The Iranian Cases: USA, 1985 PRAC. L. INST., U.C.C.
SKILLS ARTICLES 3, 4, 5, AND 9, 139-167.
7' F.D.I.C. v. Bank of Boulder, 622 F. Supp. 288 (D. Colo. 1985).
72 Id.
73 672 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1984).
7' 30 Bankr. 490 (9th Cir. 1983). In the Swift Aire Lines case, the events sur-
rounding the underlying agreement commenced in November of 1980. Prior to filing
for bankruptcy in September of 1981, Swift Aire Lines, Inc. (Swift) operated a com-
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Court of Appeals seems to think so. The Ninth Circuit applied section
365(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which prevents a trustee from as-
suming any "executory contract . . . if. . . such contract is a contract
to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommoda-
tion to or for the benefit of the debtor." The holding fortunately, is but
one of two holdings that favor non-payment by the issuing bank. 5 The
mercial airline service. In November 1980, Justin Colin, the appellant, purchased an
80% stock ownership interest in Swift for $1,775,000. He agreed in a separate invest-
ment agreement to contribute an additional $775,000 to Swift, to be made "in the event
that either Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. . . . or the Board of Directors of Swift determines
in good faith, that such funds are required by Swift for the continuing operation of its
business . . ." Id. at 491. Appellant was to deliver to Swift a letter of credit for the
$775,000 to secure the additional payment in the event that it was required.
On January 19, 1981, Crocker National Bank, appellant, issued an irrevocable
letter of credit for $775,000 pursuant to Colin's application, naming Swift as benefi-
ciary. The Board of Directors of both Swift and Wells Fargo were each given the
authority to draw against the credit. Id.
The following day, Colin communicated to Wells Fargo that Swift could draw on
the letter even if the latter filed for bankruptcy, and that the 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B)
provisions were waived, and would not be asserted by Colin if Swift attempted to draw
on the credit.
As a condition, however, to either Swift or Wells Fargo being able to draw, the
letter of credit required a statement that Swift or Wells Fargo demanded payment from
Colin of the additional contribution, and that the amount remained unpaid for five
days. On September 15, 1981, Wells Fargo made formal demand on Colin for the
contribution. On September 18, 1981, and prior to the expiration of the five days, Swift
filed a petition for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Three days later, the interim trustee was
appointed. On October 6, 1981, the trustee presented certain documents to Crocker
Bank in an attempt to draw against the letter. Crocker refused to honor the documents,
citing failure of the documents to strictly comply with the terms of the credit. The letter
of credit required that "draft/s at sight" be presented at the time demand was made
under the letter of credit. The court found that although the draft did not bear the
words "draft at sight," the draft, being functionally payable at sight, was in conformity
with the letter of credit's requirements. However, the letter of credit also required a
statement from Wells Fargo which was to be manually signed by the beneficiary and
followed by the designation "Corporate Secretary, Swift Aire Lines, Inc." This condi-
tion was not met because the trustee in bankruptcy, not the corporate secretary, drew
on the letter of credit. Thus, the court held that the bank was justified in dishonoring
the letter of credit. Id. at 491-92.
" See id. at 496 (substance of first holding). Nevertheless, each ground is a hold-
ing binding on lower courts. Based on the law of the case doctrine, the appellate court
holding is also binding on a lower court in subsequent proceedings in the same case.
Justice Nichols of the Supreme Court of Maine recently defined that doctrine as
follows:
As thus applied, the doctrine of the law of the case resembles res judicata,
but it is more limited in its application and it is not as rigidly applied. It
relates only to questions of law, and it operates only in subsequent pro-
ceedings in the same case.
tIt is also applied to those situations where], absent a showing of essen-
tially different facts, the decision by an appellate court on a given issue is
to be filed in the trial court once the case is remanded, and that the deci-
sion by an appellate court controls in subsequent proceedings in the same
court.
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other holding provided that the standby letter of credit required the
corporate secretary of Swift Aire Lines to certify that the funds were
needed for the continuing operation of the business, and that these
funds had not been furnished. Waving the banner of the principle of
strict compliance, the Ninth Circuit proclaimed that the trustee in
bankruptcy was a separate and distinct entity from the officers and di-
rectors of the bankrupt corporation in a Chapter 7 proceeding. 6
The case was wrongly decided on both matters. On the "financial
accommodation" point, the issuing bank had agreed to give financial
accommodation to its account party (who presumably remained sol-
vent), not to the beneficiary. It was the account party's debt that was
to be paid, and reimbursement was, of course, to come from the account
party as part of a partially completed transaction. There was no finan-
cial accomodation to any bankrupt debtor.
We assume that the trustee, under Chapter 7, was continuing to
operate the business, and that we do not have here a letter of credit
draw as in Emery-Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l
Bank.78 The right to obtain payment of the additional funds, if needed
Blance v. Alley, 404 A.2d 587, 589 (Me. 1979).
" Swift Aire Lines, 30 Bankr. at 495-96.
7 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986) provides:
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease pro-
hibits or restricts assignments of rights or delegation of duties, if...
(2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt
financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the
debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor ....
After a brief analysis of the legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 365(c), the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Panel in Swift Aire Lines concluded that, "[tihe drafters of the
Bankruptcy Code considered that letters of credit were executory contracts to make a
financial accommodation to or for the benefit of the debtor." 30 Bankr. at 496. We
question the correctness of this conclusion as applied to a bankrupt beneficiary, because
a letter of credit is essentially a binding commitment between the issuer and the account
party intended as a means of payment by the account party. The independence princi-
ple requires that the credit be honored regardless of the status and respective positions,
including insolvency, of the underlying parties because honor at the time of present-
ment is the raison d'etre for taking out the standby letter of credit.
8 757 F.2d (1st Cir. 1985). In the Emery-Waterhouse case, the Rhode Island
Hospital Trust National Bank (Hospital Trust Bank) financed the sale of woodburn-
ing stoves by the seller, the Franklin Cast Products Company (Franklin). The arrange-
ment consisted of a Hospital Trust Bank loan to Franklin secured by rights in Frank-
lin's accounts receivable. Emery-Waterhouse Company (Emery), a Franklin customer,
arranged with its bank, First National Bank of Boston (FNB), to provide Franklin
with a standby letter of credit to guarantee payment for all present and future
purchases, up to $329,000. The agreement provided that the credit would not be used
to pay Franklin; rather, Emery would pay its bills directly to Hospital Trust Bank,
after receiving an invoice for payment due from Franklin. Discrepancies between a
Franklin invoice and an Emery payment were reconciled via confirmation with Frank-
lin, and were thereafter treated by Hospital Trust Bank as an additional loan to
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for the continued operation of the business, was an asset of the bank-
rupt, and its absence would adversely affect the creditors of the busi-
ness. The Bankruptcy Code's language should apply to wholly execu-
tory transactions.
The Ninth Circuit did not consider the ability of the trustee to
assume the underlying agreement and sue the account party for non-
payment thereunder. If that had been the case, the account party would
have sued the issuing bank for failure to pay. Since neither of these
parties was insolvent, there were no bars to recovery. In this scenario, it
should at least be clearer to a court that the bank's financial accommo-
dation involved in the transaction was for the benefit of the account
party, not the beneficiary. The account party's damages would include
any interest collectable by the trustee, as well as any costs or losses
incurred by making payment on terms less favorable than those in the
reimbursement agreement. If the issuing bank were treated as an in-
demnitor and, upon notice, failed to defend against the beneficiary,
counsel fees would also be recoverable.
7 9
Franklin for accounting purposes. Soon thereafter, Franklin became insolvent while
still indebted to Hospital Trust Bank for approximately $2 million. Hospital Trust
Bank ordered a takeover of the corporation to organize its liquidation, and seized its
accounts. Thereafter, Hospital Trust Bank undertook to obtain additional funds by
calling upon letters of credit naming Franklin as beneficiary in the aggregate amount of
$139,700. Problems, however, arose regarding payment of the drafts, as there was con-
siderable evidence known by or available to Hospital Trust Bank that, in fact, no
money was owing from Emery to Franklin. The Hospital Trust Bank officer in charge
of liquidation first voiced concern, noting that the Bank's records were "muddled and
incomplete," and "feared that Hospital Trust Bank was trying to collect money that
Franklin's customers did not owe it." Id. at 402. Hospital Trust Bank, however, con-
tinued to press for payment.
After paying the first of two such drawings, FNB balked at paying the last one,
informing Hospital Trust Bank that Emery did not owe Franklin the money. Hospital
Trust Bank insisted, however, on payment of the remaining draft, and refused refund
of the monies already obtained from FNB.
Soon thereafter, Emery enjoined payment on the final draft. In the interim, Hos-
pital Trust Bank's own internal investigation confirmed that no money was, in fact,
owing from Emery to Franklin. The Bank, however, continued to push for payment,
and upon dissolution of the injunction, received the additional $46,000 from FNB.
Emery thereafter filed suit to recover the $139,700 that Hospital Trust Bank had
obtained from FNB (who in turn had debited Emery's FNB account) on the basis that
it owed Franklin nothing. The jury agreed, concluding that Hospital Trust Bank
should return the $139,700, and awarded Emery an additional $2 million in punitive
damages. The district court reduced that award to $1,397,000. On appeal, the judgment
and the punitive damage award were affirmed. Id. at 399. The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held, inter alia, that: (1) the bank's call on the letter of
credit was based on a fraudulent draft, and there was fraud in the transaction, since the
bank knew some or all of the money was not owed; and (2) punitive damages are
permissible where the bank acted in a "willful, reckless, or wicked manner." Id. at
404-05, 07.
79 The common law of "vouching" to warranties covers all indemnity relation-
ships. See U.C.C. § 2-607, 3-803. Sometimes it is referred to as a collateral estoppel by
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Other issues arise where a necessary statement is not signed by the
person or office holder specified in the letter and presumably in the
application for the credit. Here, although it may or may not violate the
independence principle, the bank cannot tell whether the account party
did or did not place particular trust or confidence in the holder of the
designated signatory's office as compared to a trustee in bankruptcy.
However, if only the title of the office were named, and the account
party had no control over who held the office, form should not control
substance: was there not, after all, a responsibly signed statement that
the business was continuing? Perhaps other elements not discussed in
the opinion determined the Swift Aire Lines holdings; the issues under-
lying the holdings could have been more easily discussed in the opinion
than whether section 356(c) of the Bankruptcy Code could be extended
to the account party who had signed a written waiver, and who obvi-
ously would be reluctant to throw good money after bad. However, on
the issue of particular trust in the designated signer, the decision seems
to indicate a lack of care in the trustee's preparation of the presenta-
tion. Why did the trustee not sign as successor to the secretary? If the
corporation had not been dissolved, the corporate secretary was, pre-
sumably, still alive and able to sign, or one could have been elected by
the directors for the purpose. Why was this not done? Otherwise, the
case may simply exalt form over substance, or may involve a later, un-
mentioned dispute over whether what the trustee was doing was a
'"continuing operation of the business."
In re Swift Aire Lines 0 may be a decision peculiar to standby
credits and the certificates thereunder required. In the case of commer-
cial credits, a trustee of the beneficiary should be able to draw in the
same manner as other statutory successors.81
tender of defense. If the court has in personam jurisdiction, interpleader should be used.
See generally Note, The Application of Compulsory Joinder, Intervention, Impleader
and Attachment to Letter of Credit Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 957 (1984).
80 30 Bankr. 490 (9th Cir. 1983).
s Hence, we conclude that there is a difference between naming the particular
person and naming the office held. We perceive the latter to be preferable when draft-
ing for the letter of credit transaction, "[i]f [the] issuer will wish to compare signatures
on drafts or certificates with exemplars, those who can sign should be named, by office,
preferably, and provision made to insure [that the] issuer is supplied with up to date
exemplars." See Leary, Suggestions on Drafting, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
LETTERS OF CREDIT 251-52 (1986). Mr. Davenport is in accord with this assessment,
as he recommends specifically identifying the signer of the certificates or affidavit by
office, using as examples, "the president of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce,"
"weightmaster of the Valetta Port Authority," and "the treasurer of the XYZ Corpora-
tion," in lieu of statements such as "issued" or "signed by a competent authority" or
"officially signed statements." Davenport, Letters of Credit: Some Suggestions on
Draftsmanship, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: LETTERS OF CREDIT 293 (1985).
Due to the fact that such officers at the time of drawing may be different persons from
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3.2. Account Party Insolvency
What of the "Tempest in a Twist Cap"?8" Does the insolvency of
the account party affect the rights of the beneficiary or the obligations
of the issuer to the beneficiary? The answer to this, in theory, should
be a resounding "No!" The very reason a letter of credit is demanded is
that the credit rating and the ability of the account party to pay are not
known to, or satisfactory to, the beneficiary. The function of the letter
of credit is to shift all risks of non-payment by the account party from
the beneficiary to the bank. Under the independence principle, the in-
solvency of the account party is and should be immaterial once the
credit is established as to the beneficiary. The issuing bank may have
difficulty in obtaining reimbursement from the estate of the account
party, but the bank clearly assumed this risk.
The case that caused all the furor, In re Twist Cap, Inc.,88 was
decided on a motion to dismiss a temporary restraining order, and was
subsequently settled. The case involved a standby letter of credit re-
quired by two suppliers of Twist Cap before they would sell. Judge
Paskay's opinion referred to the beneficiaries as "two unsecured credi-
tors" who should not be permitted "to receive a payment, possibly in
full, on the pre-petition indebtedness owed to them by the debtor" as it
"would amount to an impermissible preferential treatment of these two
.".' This observation overlooks several crucial factors. The two sup-
pliers were not unsecured from the moment the letter of credit was
established for them. Nor was the bank - Twist Cap's inventory fin-
ancier - unsecured. The bank's security agreement contained an after-
acquired property clause and a catch-all future advance clause.85 Value
was given when the issuing bank gave an irrevocable commitment to a
third person, namely the two suppliers. The bank's financing statement
was filed over a year before the filing in bankruptcy. The letters of
credit were issued as to one supplier over a year before bankruptcy, and
more than five months before bankruptcy as to the second supplier.88
those at the time of signing, the account party's confidence is in the integrity of the
office, not the individual.
"2 See Chaitman & Sovern, supra note 2.
3 1 Bankr. 284 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
4 Id. at 285.
8 This was determined from a copy of the security agreement contained in the
court file. A copy of the security agreement was sent to Professor Leary by the Clerk of
Court.
"' The security agreement between Twist Cap, Inc., (debtor) and the Southeast
Bank (Bank) was entered into on March 28, 1978. On December 5, 1977, and June
14, 1978, the Bank issued two letters of credit, each in the amount of $30,000 for the
debtor's account, and payable to the defendant/supplier Aluminum Company of
America (Alcoa). On March 29, 1979, the Bank issued a letter of credit in the amount
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A letter of credit could be analogized, as soon as it is established as
to the account party, as an irrevocable commitment by the bank to
make a future advance to a third party, made when the bank was al-
ready a secured inventory financier. Even if the court were to adopt a
"relationship test" as to future advances,"7 the test would be passed
because the advances were for the purchase of additional inventory.
The advance need not be made until demanded by one of the named
creditors. Under the U.C.C., future advances made pursuant to a com-
mitment under a perfected security interest take priority from the date
of the first advance, if made before the contending claimant becomes a
lien creditor." As to the set-aside provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,
the trustee should fare no better. The lien creditor powers are taken
from the U.C.C. and from other state law creating liens. When the debt
is incurred after collateral is transferred, one must still locate the ante-
cedent debt. The debt of the debtor is incurred when goods are shipped,
and at that time, the creditors, having the letter of credit in their pos-
session, are secured.
A different question arose when a letter of credit was established
as to the beneficiary after the beneficiary's debt to the account party
was incurred. In In re Air Conditioning, Inc.,8 Judge Nesbitt, of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, de-
cided the appeal of Leasing Services Corporation, the beneficiary under
a standby letter of credit. Judge Nesbitt saw a conflict between the
independence principle and the Bankruptcy Code where the letter was
issued after the debt was incurred. The solution was to let the letter of
of $25,000, payable to the defendant/supplier Central Can Company. It was not until
August 22, 1979, that Twist Cap, Inc. filed a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy. 1
Bankr. at 285.
sT The relationship rule of future advances generally holds that advances are not
covered by the security agreement unless the advances relate to the same subject matter
as did the original advance. See Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dentsply Profes-
sional Plan, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1686 (Okla. 1980); Pellegrini v. Nat'l
Bank of Washington, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 209 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1980).
As scholars in this area have observed: "[f]uture advance clauses [see U.C.C. § 9-
204(3)] must be drafted carefully, however, since courts will strike them down for a
variety of reasons, including lack of similarity between the primary obligation and the
future obligations covered by the future advances clause." T. THANH TRAI LE & E.
MURPHY, SALES AND CREDIT TRANSACTIONS HANDBOOK § 8.25 (1985 & Supp.
1986) (citing Dalton v. First Nat'l Bank, 712 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) and
John Miller Supply Co. v. Western State Bank, 55 Wis. 2d 385, 199 N.W.2d 161
(1972)).
88 U.C.C. § 9-312(7) (added by the 1972 amendments).
89 72 Bankr. 657 (S.D. Fla. 1987). See generally Gross & Borowitz, A New Twist
on Twist Cap: Invalidating a Preferential Letter of Credit in In Re Air Conditioning,
103 BANKING L.J. 368 (1986) (analyzing the predecessor case of In re Air Condition-
ing, Inc. 55 Bankr. 157 (S.D. Fla. 1985) before the appeal to Judge Nesbitt).
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credit stand, to let the bank keep its security, and to let the trustee in
bankruptcy recover the payment from the beneficiary as a voidable
preference. The bankruptcy judge had treated the entire deal as a si-
multaneous transaction, and on the petition of the bank, nullified the
letter of credit and ordered the security returned to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. The same result is reached under both solutions.9"
Several other cases have declined to follow Twist Cap.9 Judge
Paskay himself has subsequently confined Twist Cap's effect to the par-
ticular circumstances of that case.92 Twist Cap will apparently languish
until someone administers the coup de grace efficiently. If that is the
situation, then Judge Paskay's subsequent case, In re St. Petersburg
Hotel Assocs.," stands for the proposition that an outstanding letter of
credit pledged as security for the personal guaranty of the account
party's general partner is not the property of the partnership estate. In
St. Petersburg, Judge Paskay refused an injunction, stating,
there is nothing in this record which would warrant either a
finding that this particular letter of credit is property of the
estate, therefore, protected by the automatic stay or that
Royal Trust [the beneficiary] should not be permitted to pro-
ceed and obtain the proceeds on the ground that they would
90 It is not clear whether the lease had been terminated, or whether, unnoticed by
both judges, there were a post-issuance debt for rent which would not have been an
antecedent debt.
91 See In re Illinois-California Express, Inc., 50 Bankr. 232 (D. Colo. 1985); In
re Clothes, Inc., 35 Bankr. 487 (D.N.D. 1983) (noting that Twist Cap contravenes long
established commercial law principles); In re Pine Tree Elec. Co., 34 Bankr. 199 (D.
Me. 1983); In re Jay Forni, 33 Bankr. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1983); In re North Shore &
Cent. IIl. Freight Co., 30 Bankr. 377 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (noting that an injunction of
payment would undermine the purpose of the letter of credit); In re Planes, Inc., 29
Bankr. 370 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (expressly denouncing Twist Cap); In re M.J. Sales &
Distrib. Co., 25 Bankr. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (proper remedy is injunction against re-
imbursement, not against payment); In re Page, 18 Bankr. 713 (D.D.C. 1982) (re-
jecting Twist Cap, as injunctions against payment would render the letter of credit of
dubious value); see also In re Originala Petroleum Corp., 39 Bankr. 1003 (N.D. Tex.
1984); In re Briggs Transp. Co., 37 Bankr. 76 (D. Minn. 1984); In re L.B.G. Proper-
ties, Inc., 33 Bankr. 196 (S.D. Fla. 1983); In re Leisure Dynamics, Inc., 33 Bankr.
173 (D. Minn. 1983); American Employers Ins. Co. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 538
F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Printing Dep't, Inc., 20 Bankr. 677 (E.D. Va.
1981); In re Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 7 Bankr. 465 (D. Minn. 1980).
Finally, as one of the draftsmen of the Bankruptcy Code, Senator Dennis DeCon-
cini, stated in Congress, "[clontrary to the language in the case of Twist Cap, Inc. v.
Southeast Bank of Tampa, payments of the commercial paper by the letter of credit
bank . . . are not preferential or enjoinable since the payments are not being made
with the property of the estate." 126 CONG. REC. 31,139, 31,153 (1980) (citation
omitted).
92 See In re St. Petersburg Hotel Assocs., 37 Bankr. 380 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
93 Id.
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materially impact Associates.94
Judge Paskay referred to the particular circumstances in Twist
Cap as distinguishing factors, thus leaving open something of a threat
for another Twist Cap, 5 but these circumstances were neither articu-
lated nor even adumbrated in his most recent opinion. What were they?
In Twist Cap, Judge Paskay only wrote: "These conclusions should not
be construed to be a determination of the debtor's ultimate right to stop
payment of these letters of credit, but pending such determination, it is
imperative to preserve the status quo."
98
Twist Cap may now mean no more than that the estate may have
a preliminary injunction on a" Friday afternoon until a determination is
made whether particular collateral securing the credit has been trans-
ferred "for or on account of an antecedent debt."97
Had Judge Paskay believed that the draw against the letter did
not affect the estate in St. Petersburg,9" since there was no collateral
"of the debtor" supporting the credit, he undoubtedly would have said
so. The conclusion here rests on the fact that the judge in Twist Cap
did distinguish an earlier Ninth Circuit decision because that earlier
decision involved letters of credit for debts that were not antecedent
secured by properties of the bankrupt. Many cases decided after Twist
Cap and cited in St. Petersburg did, however, involve similar debts, a
consideration not highlighted in St. Petersburg.99
9 Id. at 383.
11 Id. at 382. The reference by Judge Paskay stated:
This Court had the occasion to consider this question, albeit in a totally
different context and held in the case of In Re Twist Cap, Inc., . . that
under the particular state of circumstances involving that case it was
proper to issue a temporary restraining order prohibiting the holder of a
letter of credit to demand the issuer to honor the same. This decision...
has been severely criticized and several decisions since expressly rejected
the holding without considering the facts involved in that case and the
circumstances which this Court considered to be controlling.
Id. (citation omitted). Professor White concludes from this that, "While Judge Paskay
seems to join the rest of the crowd, he still leaves open the threat for another Twist Cap
decision should he be presented a 'particular state of circumstances.' Perhaps it is the
state of confusion." White, Insolvency of Parties to Letters of Credit Transactions, in
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: LETTERS OF CREDIT 271-72 (1986).
"8 1 Bankr. at 286.
9 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
In re St. Petersburg Hotel Assocs., 37 Bankr. 380 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
In St. Petersburg, the letter of credit was issued in favor of Royal Trust Bank
of St. Petersburg (Royal Trust), a creditor of St. Petersburg Hotel Associates, Ltd.,
(Associates), the debtor partnership. The letter of credit was pledged as security for a
personal guarantee given to Royal Trust by Darrell and Lou Ann Wild. Although both
of the Wilds were non-debtors, Mr. Wild was a general partner of Associates. The
debtor partnership sought injunctive relief to prevent Royal Trust from proceeding
against Mr. Wild on his guarantee secured by the letter of credit. The court held that
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The 365-year-old advice that no one should issue letters of credit
unless the issuer "bee well advised before hee doe make them" is again
on point. Letters issued within ninety days of bankruptcy filing could
be subject to an attack as a preference if issued to support an antece-
dent debt, and if collateralized in that period by the debtor's assets.1 00
Also, while the draw may not be enjoined simply because it neither was
made nor ripened before bankruptcy, the issuer's resort to the debtor's
collateral is subject to all the bankruptcy rules governing any secured
party's resort to the collateral. Nevertheless, the issuer whose letter is to
support a debt incurred simultaneously with or subsequent to the issu-
ance should be protected from a decision stating that its payment was a
preference, since value was given to the debtor by the issuer when the
letter was issued by incurring a binding liability to a third party, and
the obligation to pay was not incurred for an antecedent debt.
3.3. Issuing Bank Insolvency
3.3.1. The Philadelphia Gear Shock
Twist Cap itself was a great shock to the law of letters of credit.
Royal Trust could proceed against Mrs. Wild on the personal guarantee, although Mr.
Wild, as general partner, was entitled to some injunctive protection. 37 Bankr. at 383.
It is significant that Judge Paskay did not refer to the difference between future debts
incurred after the issue of the letter of credit, and the issue of a letter of credit to secure
antecedent debts incurred before issuance.
10 This is the exact point of In re Air Conditioning, Inc., 72 Bankr. 657 (S.D.
Fla. 1987). The Bankruptcy Judge nullified the letter of credit, cancelled the promis-
sory note and ordered return of the debtor's certificate of deposit securing the issuing
bank's reimbursement claim. 55 Bankr. 157 (S.D. Fla. 1985). This was reversed by the
District Judge, who stated that the importance of the "independence principle" re-
quired allowing the draw to be made and permitting the bank to keep its security,
which was given six days after the issuance of the letter of credit, pursuant to the pre-
issuance agreement. The District Judge remanded, indicating that the debtor's trustee
could recover from the beneficiary under section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (11
U.S.C.A. § 550(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987)) as "the entity for whose benefit the
transfer was made." Since the beneficiary's debt arose out of a lease, rentals becoming
due after "the transfer" would not be antecedent debts. As the bankruptcy filing date
was one month and ten days after the issuance of the letter of credit, only one month's
rental out of a total debt of $47,000 was antecedent debt. The letter of credit was for
$20,000, and the lessor did not execute under a writ of replevin obtained 92 days before
the filing in bankruptcy. Erroneously, the court dismissed what could have been a claim
for new value in three monthly rentals, stating in a footnote that "simple forebearance
from repossessing goods does not constitute new value." 72 Bankr. at 662 n.4 (citations
omitted). Here, the court overlooks the difference between refraining to repossess in
collecting an existing debt, and the rental use value of leased property for a period after
dropping the replevin proceeding. There is a difference between leases and installment
payments on a debt.
Where a letter is being issued to secure a debt already created, the issuer's only
protection is to be sure that the account party has enough financing to avoid filing for
90 days.
19871
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
The municipal bond market and issuers of standby credits suffered an
even greater shock - especially as to letters of credit used to enhance
the credit of municipal debt instruments believed to be income tax free
- when Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. F.D..C.'0 was decided in 1982
by the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma." °2 That case and several similar cases, l0 3 ruled that standby
letters of credit gave rise to insured deposits under the insurance provi-
sions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended in 1950 and
1960.04 If the ruling stood, municipal bonds worth hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars, supported by letters of credit issued by insured banks,
stood to lose their tax-exempt status.'0 5 Likewise, the banking industry
became potentially liable for an assessment for back premiums, possibly
worth several million dollars.' A petition for certiorari in the Phila-
101 587 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
102 Philadelphia Gear, 587 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Okla. 1982), affid in part, rev'd
in part, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd 476 U.S. 426 (1986).
103 See, e.g., A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., No. 82 Civ. 2014-W (W.D.
Okla. Feb. 18, 1986); Allen v. F.D.I.C., 599 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Tenn. 1984);
F.D.I.C. v. Utica Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. 83 Civ. 974-W (W.D. Okla. July 18,
1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 806 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1986).
104 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1) (1982) provides:
The term "deposit" means -
(1) the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held
by a bank in the usual course of business and for which it has given
or is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or unconditionally,
to a commercial ... account, or which is evidenced by. . . a letter
of credit or a traveler's check on which the bank is primarily liable:
Provided, That, without limiting the generality of the term "money
or its equivalent, any such account or instrument must be regarded
as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of money when credited
or issued in exchange for checks or drafts or for a promissory note
upon which the person obtaining any such credit or instrument is
primarily or secondarily liable . .. .
105 Under 26 U.S.C. § 103(h)(2) (Supp. III 1985) of the Internal Revenue Code,
municipal bonds cannot be guaranteed in whole or in part by any agency or instrumen-
tality of the United States for the purpose of retaining their tax exemption. Under the
assumption that F.D.I.C. coverage would constitute such a guarantee, and under the
Philadelphia Gear analysis, municipal bonds backed by standby credits issued by
F.D.I.C.-insured banks in the United States became suspect as to their tax-exempt
status. See also Hunter, Letter of Credit Issue Clouds Bonds' Tax Free Status, AM.
BANKER, March 21, 1985, at 4; Whelan, Standby Letters of Credit: Threat to Tax-
Free IDB's?, 194 N.Y.L.J. 17 (Sept. 26, 1985).
108 The liability would stem from the F.D.I.C.'s potential requirement, to insure
approximately $120 billion worth of outstanding standby letters of credit. The result
would be that the banks would be compelled to pay as much as $100 million for the
F.D.I.C. assessment based on then existing deposit liabilities. See Kozolchyk, Is Present
Letter of Credit Law Up to Its Task?, 8 GEO. MASON U.L. REv. 285, 306, n.44
(1986). See also McLaughlin, Letters of Credit and FDIC Insurance, 193 N.Y.L.J. I
(Apr. 12, 1985).
It is noteworthy that no deposit insurance premiums had been collected by the
F.D.I.C. on the face amount of outstanding letters of credit as deposits. See infra text
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delphia Gear case was promptly filed and granted.10 7 On May 27,
1986, a 6-3 decision of the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Tenth Circuit.10 8
About a century ago, Peter Finley Dunne, writing as Mr. Dooley,
stated, "No matther whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th'
supreme coort follows th' iliction returns."'0 9 It would seem that "th'
supreme coort" is also sensitive to economic returns: it has ruled that a
standby credit secured by a promissory note was conditioned upon a
draw by reason of an oral agreement between the account party and
issuing bank (which the Court ruled to be governed by federal law and,
therefore, the conditional note was not a promissory note as defined in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act). Hence, the note did not create an
insured deposit. This sleight of hand appears to erase the shock of the
opinion; but, as is the trouble with most result-oriented opinions, it
may raise more problems than it resolves.
For years, the F.D.I.C. had not considered commercial letters of
credit subject to deposit insurance premiums even when supported by a
negotiable promissory note, and had treated standby credits in the same
manner. One basis for this position with regard to standby credits was
that, when the F.D.I.C. issued its regulations in 1935, standby credits
were rarely in evidence; when they first began to be used in any quan-
tity, the general expectation was that drawings thereunder would be
scarce. 0 Further, the original definition of deposit referred to:
the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received by a
bank in the usual course of business . . . which is evidenced
by its certificate of deposit . . . together with such other ob-
ligations of a bank as the board of directors [of the F.D.I.C.]
shall find and shall prescribe by its regulations to be deposit
accompanying note 114.
107 Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 474 U.S.
918 (1985).
108 Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Powell and Stevens. Philadelphia Gear,
476 U.S. 426, 106 S. Ct. 1931 (1986). Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined. 106 S. Ct. at 1939.
109 J. Bartlett, The Supreme Court's Decisions, in FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 721
(15th ed. 1980).
110 Standby letters of credit are issued with the expectation that the account party
will perform, and hence, there will be no draw. Banks usually charge one percent or
less of face value for standby letters of credit compared to two percent or higher for
surety bonds. See Letter from Professor Dan Murray to Senator William Proxmire
(June 7, 1976), reprinted in Regulation of Standby Letters of Credit: Hearings Before
the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on S. 2347, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
147-48 (1976). For most banks, the insurance industry's "law of large numbers" is not
applicable, and for bank standby letters, there is no reinsurance market.
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liabilities by general usage .... ."
Shortly after the creation of the F.D.I.C., bank officials met with
F.D.I.C. personnel. In response to a question at that meeting regarding
the status of letters of credit from a banker, an F.D.I.C. official replied:
If your letter of credit is issued by a charge against a deposi-
tor's account or for cash and the letter of credit is reflected
on your books as a liability, you do have a deposit liability.
If, on the other hand, you merely extend a line of credit to
your customer, you will only show a contingent liability on
your books."1
A regulation was issued, and the regulatory language was later ex-
pressly incorporated into the statutory language by congressional
amendment."' 3 The Philadelphia Gear opinion also referred without
objection to the F.D.I.C.'s contention that it had never charged deposit
insurance premiums on standby letters of credit. " 4
The Philadelphia Gear reversal was based upon the reasoning
that the F.D.I.C.'s interpretation had been continuous and consistent,
and that legislation passed by Congress in 1960 had expressly adopted
the language of the regulation. 1 5 The Court stated that the regulation
was also consistent with the congressional purpose, and that it "may
certainly stand," even though the regulation did not state that it was
based on that congressional purpose.11 " In the process, the Court ruled
I' 106 S. Ct. at 1937 (1986) (quoting Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49
Stat. 684, 685-86 (1937).
112 F.D.I.C. v. Irving Trust Co., 137 F. Supp. 145, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (quoting
transcript of meeting).
11, The specific regulation was 12 C.F.R. § 301.1(d) (1939), revoked after incor-
poration into statutory law, 12 C.F.R. § 234 (Supp. 1962). The Supreme Court noted:
[T]he current statutory definition of "deposit," added by Congress in
1960, was expressly designed to incorporate the FDIC's rules and regula-
tions on "deposits." As Committees of both Houses of Congress explained
the amendments: "The amended definition would include the present stat-
utory definition of deposits, and the definition of deposits in the rules and
regulations of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, [along] with
. . . changes [in sections other than what is now § 1813(l)(1)]." H.R.Rep.
No. 1827, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1960).
Philadelphia Gear, 106 S. Ct. at 1937-38 (Justice O'Connor's emphasis). The Court
concluded, "Congress, therefore, has expressly incorporated into the statutory scheme
the regulations that the FDIC devised to assist it in determining what constitutes a
'deposit' within the statutory scheme." Id.
14 See 106 S. Ct. at 1938. The F.D.I.C. further contended that it had not charged
premiums on any other letters of credit, but the case only affected standby credits.
15 See 106 S. Ct. at 1936.
a We point out, however, that nothing in the record indicates that Congress had
any "congressional purpose" except such as was behind the adoption of the F.D.I.C.'s
regulation, enunciated long after the original adoption of the concept of deposit
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that the note in Philadelphia Gear was not a promissory note for pur-
poses of federal law because, pursuant to an oral agreement between
the bank and the account party, it was understood that nothing would
be considered due on the note and no interest would be charged by the
bank until there had been a draw under the letter of credit, despite the
fact that the note was unconditional on its face.'
The Court placed much emphasis on the intention of Congress to
protect "hard earnings" entrusted to banks,118 but drew no lines to
show why a commercial letter of credit backed by an unconditional
promissory note would differ from a similarly backed standby letter of
credit.""
Nor, for that matter, did the dissenting opinion draw any such
insurance.
117 It is correct that, as between immediate parties, an oral condition precedent to
effectiveness may be shown absent a clear indication that the note represented a fully
integrated agreement. See 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 935 (1952 & Supp. 1986). But is the
FDIC an "immediate" party?
We are not unmindful of the rule that parol evidence is inadmissable to attach
conditions to a negotiable instrument which is absolute on its face. See 32A C.J.S.
Evidence § 937 (1952 & Supp. 1986); See also 3 S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE §
16:59 (6th ed. 1972) ("Accordingly, it is the universally accepted rule that such an
instrument [bills and notes] may not be contradicted or varied by parol evidence..."
(citing, e.g., Brown v. Spofford, 95 U.S. 474, 480 (1877). See generally, 12 AM. JUR.
2d Bills & Notes §§ 1241-95 (1970 & Supp. 1986).
It is our contention that the Court failed to distinguish between an oral condition
precedent regarding delivery of an unconditional promissory note, and an oral condition
on the promise itself, which would impermissably render the obligations of the note
conditional. It is the universal rule that a written document, unconditional on its face
and fully executed, can be shown by parol evidence as between immediate parties to
have been delivered subject to a condition precedent. The conditional delivery of the
promissory note may have altered the legal relationship of the parties in Philadelphia
Gear. But the majority's discussion of the unconditional nature of the note involved did
not take into account the usual rule that such conditions are not enforceable against a
bank liquidator.
118 The majority opinion made continued reference to preserving "hard earnings"
or "hard assets." See, e.g., 106 S. Ct. at 1934-37. It is not easy to understand how
"hard earnings," especially those of individuals, have anything to do with the problem
of letters of credit and promissory notes.
"' The same obligation of no interest and no payment until a draw applies to
promissory notes unconditional on their face given to back up or secure commercial
letters of credit. The difference is that under a standby letter of credit, the makers' and
issuing banks' expectation at the time of delivery is that there will never be a draw. See,
e.g., B. McCullough, Letters of Credit: Concepts and Classifications, in PRAc. L.
INST., BANKING PROBLEMS UNDER THE U.C.C. 147 (1982) ("Under a standby letter
of credit, the issuer engages to honor the draft on demand for payment by the benefi-
ciary upon a failure of performance of the underlying transaction."). In the case of
commercial letters of credit, the expected event is a draw in a short time. Most bankers,
the authors have been told, use the unconditional on its face note only for commercial
letters of credit and a conditional note for standbys. The practice at Penn Square Bank
apparently differed. This practice was the basis for the F.D.I.C.'s argument that a note
subject to oral conditions was not to be considered a "money equivalent" for deposit
insurance purposes.
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line. Indeed, on the track taken by the dissent, such a distinction was
not necessary. They saw the matter simply as one of construction.
When the statute used the word "promissory note," it was construed in
its commercial sense under commercial law, and was, therefore, the
equivalent of money.120 The reasoning was that had the note been ne-
gotiated to a third party for value, the agreement between the account
party and the issuing bank would not apply to a holder in due course.
The conclusion was then drawn that the promissory note could, at the
whim of the bank, be transformed into money and was, therefore, the
equivalent of money. Thus, to the dissent, the face amount of all letters
of credit were insured deposits from the day of issuance.
Neither opinion intimated that the justices were aware that prom-
issory notes hardly ever circulate, or that they are no longer accepted as
the equivalent of money. Nor does the majority opinion provide any
guideline as to what would happen if, in a commercial letter of credit,
both the bank and the account party "understood that nothing would be
considered due on the note and no interest charged by [the issuing
bank] unless [the beneficiary] presented drafts on the note."12 Since
this may occur in many cases, the F.D.I.C. may have won the battle for
all letters of credit. The Court did say that a note such as was involved
in the case "was not a promissory note for purposes of the federal law
set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1813()(1).1122 However, the majority's conclu-
sion shifts its focus from the "note" to a combination of the history of
administrative practices and the contingency of the note quite early in
the opinion. The majority stated, "[w]hen we weigh all these factors
together, we are constrained to conclude that the term 'deposit' does not
include a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory
120 The dissent, too, was on an all-or-nothing track, but their reasoning could be
used to draw a distinction between the letters of credit supported by facially uncondi-
tional promissory notes and those supported by notes facially conditioned. See 106 S.
Ct. at 1939-41. This would eliminate most standbys from deposit coverage, and would
remove the cloud over the municipal bond market as to the tax-exempt nature of inter-
est on mutual bonds supported by a standby letter of credit. Their reasoning would,
however, create a problem for commercial letters of credit.
121 Id. at 1933.
122 Id. at 1934. The "federal purpose" approach may go too far. Standard com-
mercial terms in a federal statute should not have special federal meanings unless there
is a strong need to protect a federal interest, as in the case of forgery of federal checks
and state laws expanding issuer liability. The Court was, however, between an irresis-
tible force and an immovable object. The Court failed to take into consideration the
possible interpretation that only when the credit was considered fully paid for by the
promissory note would the credit be considered an insured deposit. Otherwise, if the
note merely evidenced the account party's obligation to reimburse the issuer or was
security for that payment, it was not within the statutory phrase of "in exchange for
the letter of credit."
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note."12 Although, the balance of the opinion seems based entirely on
the F.D.I.C.'s interpretation excluding letters of credit and the 1960
Congressional verbatim adoption of the regulation (which, admittedly,
does not expressly exclude a standby letter of credit backed by a contin-
gent promissory note) the opinion does not mention the existence of any
pre-1960 discussion or non-application of the regulation to standby let-
ters of credit. Nor is there mention of any such data being brought to
the attention of Congress in the course of the adoption of the 1960
amendments.
The essential differences between standby letters of credit and
commercial letters are: (1) the latter are almost always drawn upon,
but the former hardly ever; (2) the time between issue and drawing is
usually longer in the case of standby letters of credit; and (3) the use of
promissory notes that are facially contingent is very prevalent in
standby letters of credit, and at present, rare in commercial letters of
credit. None of these differences are highlighted in the statute or the
Supreme Court's Philadelphia Gear opinion.
Indeed, a verbatim construction of the statute would also exclude a
number of both standby and commercial letters of credit from the defi-
nition of deposit. Streamlined for our purposes, the statute provides:
The term deposit means (1) the unpaid balance of money or
its equivalent received or held by a bank in the usual course
of business . . . which is evidenced by . . . a letter of credit
• . . on which the bank is primarily liable: Provided, that,
• . . any such instrument must be regarded as evidencing the
receipt of the equivalent of money when . . . issued in ex-
change for . . . a promissory note upon which the person
obtaining such . . . instrument is primarily or secondarily
liable. 2
The key phrase here is "issued in exchange for." It is significant that
both the majority and the minority in Philadelphia Gear did not em-
phasize or discuss "issued in exchange for," but referred instead to a
"standby letter of credit backed by." 2 Is there a difference? It is prob-
able that when the wording was drafted by the F.D.I.C., the drafters
were thinking of the letter of credit fully funded by a charge to an
account, to cash, or to a promissory note taken by the bank as payment
for funding. The reference to an account party who may be "seconda-
123 Id. at 1935.
124 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1) (1987) (emphasis added).
125 See 106 S. Ct. at 1932 (majority's reference); id. at 1939 (dissent's reference)
(emphasis added).
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rily liable" seems to indicate a note of a third person taken as payment.
If so, then it is clearer that any contingent promissory note, taken as
security to evidence the obligation to reimburse the bank for its pay-
ment of a draw by the beneficiary, is not included. This reasoning is
consistent with the approach taken by an F.D.I.C official at an earlier
hearing, a transcript of which appeared in a 1955 case.126 It is also
consistent with section 3-802(1) of the U.C.C. This section governs in-
struments "taken for an obligation," language very similar to the "is-
sued in exchange for" language."2 ' This approach would require the
inclusion of both commercial as well as standby letters of credit when
the note is taken in satisfaction or substitution of the obligation of the
account party to reimburse the issuer, and it would exclude both
standby and commercial letters of credit where the note is taken as se-
curity and is not treated as a cash equivalent. Hence, deposit insurance
obligations would only attach where the note, for letter of credit pur-
poses, was given in lieu of a deposit securing the account party's obliga-
tion to reimburse and in satisfaction of the reimbursement obligation.
How then, should the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Phila-
delphia Gear be taken? It seems that the many references in the opin-
ion to the congressional desire to create the F.D.I.C. to protect "hard
earnings" and "hard assets" are not very helpful, since, as between the
immediate parties, a promissory note is not a hard asset, and is more
than the statutory obligation for immediate reimbursement in U.C.C. §
5-114(3).28
... F.D.I.C. v. Irving Trust Co., 137 F. Supp. 145, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See
supra text accompanying note 112.
127 U.C.C. § 3-802, Effect of Instrument on Obligation for Which It Is Given,
states:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underly-
ing obligation
(a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer, maker
or acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse to the instru-
ment against the underlying obligor; and
(b) in any other case the obligation is suspended pro tanto until the
instrument is due or if it is payable on demand until its present-
ment. If the instrument is dishonored action may be maintained on
either the instrument or the obligation; discharge of the underlying
obligor on the instrument also discharges him on the obligation.
(2) The taking in good faith of a check which is not postdated does not of
itself so extend the time on the original obligation as to discharge a surety.
2 U.C.C. § 5-114(3) states:
Unless otherwise agreed an issuer which has duly honored a draft or de-
mand for payment is entitled to immediate reimbursement of any payment
made under the credit and to be put in effectively available funds not later
than the day before maturity of any acceptance made under the credit.
As between the maker and the payee (who deal with each other), no defenses are cut
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We suggest that one somewhat unique aspect of Philadelphia
Gear should produce the desired result. Congress, in the Banking Act
of 1935, included in its definition of "deposit" a reference to certificates
of deposit and trust funds, but concluded the definition with, "together
with such other obligations of a bank as the board of directors [of the
F.D.I.C.] shall find and shall prescribe to be deposit liabilities by gen-
eral usage."I1M Less than two months later, the F.D.I.C. in Rule 1 of
October 1, 1935, issued a regulation which, among other things, stated
that "letters of credit must be regarded as issued for the equivalent of
money when issued in exchange for. . promissory notes upon which
the person procuring [the letter of credit] is primarily or secondarily
liable."18 0 In 1960, Congress included this language in the statute, and
in 1962, the 1935 rule was repealed as "revoked after incorporation
into statutory law."1"" Since that time, and possibly before, the
F.D.I.C. and general banking usage have treated the language as not
covering commercial or standby letters of credit. Hence, by limiting the
reference to letters of credit to the type of letter covered by contempo-
rary and subsequent administrative practice, any insured deposit status
should apply only to commercial letters of credit.
We can thus summarize the Philadelphia Gear holding as fol-
lows: When Congress delegates to an administrative agency the right
and power to prescribe by regulation additional obligations to be in-
cluded within a statutory definition, and later includes the regulation
within a revised statutory definition verbatim, the language includes
only what the regulation was construed to include, and excludes what
was excluded by the regulators, regardless of whether the exclusion oc-
curs before or after the statutory incorporation. In such a case, the reg-
ulatory construction, if consistent with general industry usage, must be
followed by the courts. Consequently, a letter of credit accompanied by
a contingent promissory note as security for reimbursement does not
off. See U.C.C. § 3-306, Rights of One Not a Holder in Due Course.
I" Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 685-86. This section states:
The term "deposit" means the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent
received by a bank in the usual course of business and for which it has
given or is obligated to give credit to a commercial, checking, savings, time
or thrift account, or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, and
trust funds held by such bank whether retained or deposited in any de-
partment of such bank or deposited in another bank, together with such
other obligations of a bank as the board of directors [of the F.D.I.C.] shall
find and shall prescribe by its regulations to be deposit liabilities by gen-
eral usage ...
130 12 C.F.R. § 301.1(d) (1939) (codifying Regulation I, Rule 1, Oct. 1, 1935).
131 12 C.F.R. § 301.1(d) (1939) (revoked after incorporation into statutory law,
12 C.F.R. 234 (Supp. 1962)).
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create a federally insured deposit, regardless of whether it is facially or
orally contingent as between issuer and account party. In this regard,
any distinction between standby letters of credit and commercial letters
of credit will not withstand analysis. It then follows that letters of
credit have survived the initial shock of the Philadelphia Gear case.
3.3.2. Provability Rules
Less drastic in impact are the "provability" rules applied where
the issuer is insolvent.1"2 The courts have not followed the F.D.I.C.'s
position that by the time the bank is closed, if the beneficiary has not
made a claim on a standby letter of credit, then that credit will not be
considered in the insolvency of the issuer.' 33
Where the claims under standby letters of credit have ripened
before insolvency, and presentation has been made before a cut-off date
for filing claims or before the first distribution to claimants, courts have
required their inclusion. 3 Various questions might, however, arise
132 Generally, the beneficiaries of a letter of credit issued by an insolvent bank are
limited to the recovery of only "provable claims." See White, Insolvency of Parties to
Letter of Credit Transactions, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: LETTERS OF CREDIT
278 (1986). These claims will be grouped with other general claimants absent priority,
either by way of "secured deposits" or through U.C.C. § 5-117. Id. Generally, three
conditions must be met for claims under a credit to be provable: (1) the claim must be
in existence prior to insolvency; (2) the total liability must be certain when the benefi-
ciaries sue the receiver; and (3) the claims must be timely made prior to the distribution
of assets from the receivership estate. See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. F.D.I.C., 751
F.2d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 1984). Claims which are uncertain at the time of the issu-
ers insolvency, but become certain and are filed prior to distribution of the receivership
assets are deemed provable, and should be permitted to participate in ratable dividends.
See First Empire Bank v. F.D.I.C., 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
919 (1978). For further coverage of the provability rules and issuer insolvency, see J.
DOLAN, supra note 6, at 1 12.02; Berger, The Effects of Issuing Bank Insolvency on
Letters of Credit, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161 (1980); Verkuil, Bank Solvency and
Standby Letters of Credit: Lessons From the USNB Failure, 53 TUL. L. REv. 314
(1979); Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REv.
716 (1973).
"' See First Empire Bank v. F.D.I.C., 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1978); see also
First Empire Bank-New York v. F.D.I.C., 634 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981) (a connected case in which the court clarifies to some degree
its earlier holding); Philadelphia Gear, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984); In re F & T
Contractors, Inc., 718 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that while the F.D.I.C. corpo-
ration was not liable for the wrongful termination of a standby credit, the F.D.I.C.
receiver was liable as it had assumed the contingent liabilities of the issuer); Interna-
tional Westminster Bank, Ltd. v. F.D.I.C., 509 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that
credit beneficiaries could state a claim for relief under the National Bank Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 91, 194); F.D.I.C. v. Freudenfield, 492 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Wis. 1980)
(although court does not address the F.D.I.C.'s position, it does assess the facts of the
beneficiary's claim against the F.D.I.C. and the court's judgment in favor of the benefi-
ciary on the strength of First Empire).
134 See, e.g., First Empire Bank, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1978).
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where the right to draw has not ripened in a standby credit. The fol-
lowing situations demonstrate these questions:
Case 1: Both account party and beneficiary are solvent and have
good credit. A substitute letter can be obtained, but at a greater cost. Is
there a provable claim for the added cost?. 5
Case 2: Both account party and beneficiary are solvent, but the
account party's credit status has worsened. A substitute letter of credit
cannot be obtained. Does either the beneficiary or the account party
have any provable claim against the insolvent issuer? For what?
Case 3: The account party is also insolvent and its insolvency rep-
resentative rejects the wholly executory underlying contract. Does the
beneficiary have any claim against the insolvent issuing bank?1"'
Case 4: The beneficiary is also insolvent and its insolvency repre-
sentative rejects the underlying contract. 13 7 The issuing bank may or
may not be insolvent.
Absent relevant case law, claims under Cases 1 and 2 should be
considered provable. The lag between the closing of the bank and the
computation of a distribution should be sufficient to develop the facts
needed in time to file the claims. In Case 1, the claim is for an antici-
133 The F.D.I.O. apparently takes the position that a substitute letter should be
obtained by routinely denying liability on outstanding letters of credit where no draw
has been made. As a result of the Philadelphia Gear litigation, the denial will probably
only apply to unripened claims. Obtaining a substitute would, however, ostensibly be
an account party's mitigation of damages under the underlying contract, and on the
contract created by the application. Here the bank has, in effect, repudiated its contract
with the account party, and thereby caused the account party to incur extra expense, to
the extent of paying an additional fee, which might well be greater than the original
unrefunded fee. The account party will be the claimant here. Yet, Article 5 provides no
remedy to an account party aggrieved by the repudiation of the letter by the issuer. It
seems that the general principle of placing an aggrieved party in the position it would
have realized had performance occurred should permit recovery of the additional cost.
This argument follows by analogy to a buyer's "cover" damages under U.C.C. § 2-712,
since an account party's claim is not on the letter of credit.
136 Here, in essence, we have a double repudiation. Again, in the case of the
standby letters of credit, the draw is usually based on the provision in the contract, a
contract now rejected by the account party, requiring the payment in the event of a
failure to perform. See supra discussion of standby letters of credit at note 43. The
insolvency provision for rejection of executory contracts does not destroy a right to dam-
ages for anticipatory repudiation. See 2 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, THE LAW OF
MODERN COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 7:30 (rev. ed. 1980 & Supp. 1986). In the case of
national banks, the claim against an issuing bank would be subject to the ripening
rules. See supra notes 133-34. Thus, there may be a question of timing. In this discus-
sion, if the insolvency of the account party and the rejection of the contract occurred
before the insolvency of the bank, the claim would be ripe and could be timely filed.
The reverse order of occurrence of the insolvencies could leave the beneficiary with a
claim too contingent to assert against the issuing bank, but its contract claim against the
account party will still be maintainable.
137 In this case, we have three insolvencies and, insofar as the issuing bank is
concerned, there should be no liability, despite the independence principle.
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patory breach of contract. In Case 2, the account party's claim is the
same; but the measure of damages may be quite different. In either
case, a duty to mitigate damages would require good faith efforts to
obtain a substitute credit. The added cost is the damage in Case 1.
The court in Bryant v. Kerr"8 dismissed a claim, based on a stan-
dard F.D.I.C. repudiation letter, for anticipatory repudiation on the
grounds that the beneficiary had not proven it was ready, able and
willing to perform by drawing because the account party's performance
was not yet due. The court went further, however, and held that a
clause requiring a letter of credit to be "maintained in full force and
effect" had not been breached by the issuing bank's insolvency. This
seems to be an incorrect approach. A claim against an insolvent bank is
worth considerably less than a claim against a solvent bank. Obviously,
the court was disturbed by the beneficiary's rush to the cancellation
clause without giving the account party time to tender a substitute letter
from a solvent bank. In fact, the account party had tendered a substi-
tute letter after receipt of the termination notice on the original letter.
In Case 2, the account party's damage would depend on whether
the failure to maintain a letter of credit constitutes a default in the
underlying contract, thereby triggering the right to the damages pro-
tected by the letter of credit.1"9 We do not know the answer, but feel
that the account party should have little recovery, since it would have
had to reimburse the issuing bank had that bank paid a proper
draw. 4" If the beneficiary were to cancel the underlying contract for
as3 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). While the
terms of Article 5 of the U.C.C. provide no remedy for the account party, and since,
under U.C.C. § 1-109, section captions are part of the Code, § 5-115's caption, "Rem-
edy for Improper Dishonor or Anticipatory Repudiation," could be taken as exclusive.
But this should only apply to the beneficiary under the independence principle, since
the account party's claim is not on the letter of credit, but arises out of the application
contract.
1S9 Generally speaking, a contract to pay via means of a letter of credit should
imply an obligation to keep an established credit in force. The letter of credit usually is
a condition to the beneficiary's willingness to deal with the account party concerning
the underlying contract.
140 Assuming the account party can meet the burden of proof, and the beneficiary
does not cancel the underlying contract, the account party would have no damages. But
when we add a cancellation by the beneficiary caused by the issuer's repudiation of the
letter of credit, the account party would have to pay the stipulated liquidated damages
in any event, either as reimbursement to the issuing bank, or as direct damages to the
beneficiary. But can the account party recover other lost profit damages based on proof
that it could have successfully completed the underlying contract, accompanied by the
requisite proof of its lost profits? Such evidence will rarely be available to an account
party unable to procure a substitute letter, but the situation could occur. Here we again
face the problem of no account party remedy in Article 5 of the U.C.C., and the proba-
ble characterization of these damages as consequential which "may be had except as
specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law." U.C.C. § 1-106(1). Here, the
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failure to maintain the letter of credit, the account party could ordina-
rily recover from the issuer for loss of profits on proof of ability to
complete the contract without default, had the insolvent issuer assumed
the letter of credit instead of rejecting it. Recovery of such damages,
however, depends on whether the issuing bank would have any liability
for consequential damages. Usually, such damages are excluded by the
contract between the account party and the issuing bank. Also, the fail-
ure to obtain a substitute letter (a default in Case 2) makes it extremely
doubtful that the account party will be able to prove its ability to com-
plete the contract. Cases 3 and 4 are cases of double insolvency. In Case
4, it seems that in commercial letter of credit cases, the bank should
have no liability: the double rejecting of the underlying contract in such
a case could excuse the bank's performance despite the independence
principle."4 No transfer has been made on the underlying contract, the
receiver of money has not parted with value, and the payor has not
received the consideration for which payment was made. Thus, no one
has a loss of value.
In the standby letter of credit cases, the insolvent beneficiary's re-
jection of the underlying contract would be based on the fact that the
contract was no longer profitable to complete. In such cases, there
should be no recovery against the insolvent bank by the account party
or by the beneficiary.
Assuming a standby credit situation in Case 3, however, the de-
fault could be the precise default for which the letter of credit was ob-
tained, even if the standby was to ensure the payment of unpaid com-
"independence principle" can operate to the extent that the contract to issue or not
repudiate, based on the application agreement, can be construed to be outside of the
Code, and hence, not subject to U.C.C. § 1-106. On the other hand, U.C.C. § 5-109,
Issuer's Obligation To Its Customer, must also be taken to be only its obligation to
perform under the letter when draft(s) and documents are tendered, and not to refer to
breach of the implied agreement to maintain. U.C.C. § 5-102(3) and the comments
thereto support this conclusion. As applicable to this situation, the text states: "The fact
that this Article states a rule does not by itself require, imply or negate application of
... a converse rule to a situation not provided for or to a person not specified by this
Article." U.C.C. § 5-102(3). Support is also found in the comment. The unnumbered
paragraph following "Purposes" states: "To define the transactions to which this Arti-
cle applies and to indicate that the rules stated are not intended to be exhaustive of the
law applicable to letters of credit." Id. Paragraph 2 of the comment, in pertinent part,
states:
The rules embodied in the Article can be viewed as those expressing the
fundamental theories underlying letters of credit. For this reason the sec-
ond sentence of subsection (3) makes explicit the court's power to apply a
particular rule by analogy to causes not within its terms, or to refrain
from doing so.
Id. (emphasis added).
141 See supra text accompanying note 16.
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mercial invoices. But, where the letter of credit's purpose was to ensure
the payment of liquidated damages, the beneficiary should also have a
claim against the receiver of the issuing bank for anticipatory repudia-
tion on the part of the issuing bank, with deduction for any recdvery
obtainable from the account party."42
To the extent necessary to achieve the results indicated above,
there should be an exception to the independence principle, and, per-
haps some modification of the rules requiring the right to draw to have
"ripened" before distribution.14 In cases of the insolvency of the issu-
ing bank where the letter of credit has not been prepaid, the essential
use of the letter of credit as an instrument to ensure payment in an
underlying contract should be recognized. The beneficiary presenting
documents should be able to reach the account party's obligation and
apply it to pay the full amount to the issuing bank to the extent the
bank does not pay the beneficiary. 4 Where both the issuing bank and
the account party are insolvent, the beneficiary should be entitled to
dividends from both up to the total amount due upon presentation of
conforming documents.
1 45
4. CONCLUSION
Despite the hoary antiquity of the device, letters of credit have
survived the three insolvency shocks with youthful vigor. While the
conclusions set forth above appear sound, we cannot assume that all
courts and commentators will agree with them. What then should be
142 The beneficiary cannot recover both. Since any recovery by the beneficiary
against the issuing bank would trigger a right in the insolvency representative of that
bank to reimbursement from the account party, it seems logical to have the account
party the primary source, with the beneficiary filing in both insolvencies. The benefi-
ciary would benefit from any rights to collateral under U.C.C. § 5-117. If there is
collateral, that should be the primary source of recovery before the beneficiary files
unsecured claims against both the issuing bank and the account party for any
deficiency.
148 In insolvency situations, the rights of other creditors of the insolvent bank re-
quire that, for example, the beneficiary be made as nearly whole as possible by consid-
ering the three contracts as one transaction and allocating the beneficiary a recovery
source that least harms other creditors. Where the account party and the issuing bank
are both insolvent, the acceptability of credits will be enhanced by making some reser-
vation for the beneficiary in a first distribution, which, if the claim did not ripen by the
time of the last distribution, could be distributed pro rata to other creditors.
144 Of course, to the extent the bank pays, it should have a claim for reimburse-
ment against the account party, subordinate only to the beneficiary's right to receive
full payment of the balance due. If the account party is also insolvent, total claims
should not be increased. The beneficiary and the bank should have but one claim.
145 In all cases discussed, we are assuming that the presented documents are con-
forming documents under our discussion of the "linguistic equivalency" or "substantive
identity" reading of the strict compliance principle.
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done?
As to the effect of issuer insolvency and federal deposit insurance,
much costly litigation could be avoided by a federal statute that makes
the difference between commercial and standby letters of credit in is-
suer insolvency cases clear beyond argument. The statute could be
modeled along the lines of our suggested analysis of the Supreme
Court's holding in Philadelphia Gear and our suggested solutions dis-
cussed above.'
48
In the case of issuer insolvency with prefunded letters of credit
outstanding, the provisions of section 5-117 of the U.C.C. should be
made applicable to national banks by federal administrative regulation,
if practicable, and if not, by statute.
Supplemental comments to the U.C.C. might effectively indicate to
the courts that they should follow the foregoing suggestions regarding
the independence principle and the principle of linguistic identity in
strict conformity. These comments may not have the force of comments
in existence before a legislature adopted the U.C.C. or a second set of
amendments where such comments would, in usual course, be made
available to the legislators before the final vote. Nevertheless, such sup-
plemental comments should have a far greater force than an article or a
treatise because they represent the opinion of the American Law Insti-
tute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. This suggestion does not result in legislation by comment: the
supplemental comment(s) would merely state the substance of the letter
of credit transaction as a whole, a transaction embodied in three con-
tracts which are to be treated separately for most, but not all, purposes.
146 See Section 3.3.
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